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The internal structure of the corporation produces relationships
of power and dependency. As a result, the law of corporations historically has attempted to provide a principled and coherent set of
regulations to ensure that those who hold power are accountable to
those who are dependent upon its fair exercise. The corporation is a
human enterprise, subject to human failings, and the goal of the law
has been to prevent, correct, or rectify those failings when necessary.
The bulk of these adjustive mechanisms come under the general
heading of fiduciary duty.' It is my thesis that courts, aided in part
by legislatures,2 increasingly have moved away from applying broad
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I For studies exploring the concept of fiduciary duty, see 2A A. SCOTT & W.
FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS §§ 170-170.25 (4th ed. 1987); J.C. SHEPHERD, THE
LAW OF FIDUCIARIES (1981); Anderson, Conflicts of Interest: Efficiency, Fairness and

CorporateStructure, 25 UCLA L. REV. 738 (1978); Brudney, Corporate Governance,Agency
Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403 (1985) [hereinafter Brudney,
Corporate Governance]; Brudney, Fiduciary Ideology in Transactions Affecting Corporate
Control, 65 MICH. L. REV. 259 (1966) [hereinafter Brudney, FiduciaryIdeology]; Clark,

Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF
BusINESS 55 (J. Pratt & R. Zeckhauser eds. 1985); Davis,Judicial Review of Fiduciary
Decisionmaking-Some TheoreticalPerspectives,80 Nw. U.L. REV. 1 (1985); DeMott, Beyond
Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DuKE L.J. 879; Frankel, Fiduciary
Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795 (1983); Jacobson, The Private Use of Public Authority:

Sovereignty andAssociations in the Common Law, 29

BUFFALO

L. REV. 599 (1980); Phillips,

ManagerialMisuse of Property: The Synthesizing Threadin CorporateDoctrine, 32 RUTGERS L.
REV. 184 (1979); Ruder, Duty of Loyalty-A Law Professor's Status Report, 40 Bus. LAw.
1383 (1985); Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 539 (1949); Sealy,
Fiduciary Relationships, 1962 CAMBRIDGE LJ.69; Shepherd, Towards a Unified Concept of
FiduciaryRelationships, 97 LAw Q.REV. 51 (1981); Weinrib, The FiduciaryObligation, 25
U. TORONTO L.J. 1 (1975).
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Legislative aid has come, for instance, in the form of statutes providing
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prophylactic fiduciary principles to prevent or resolve intra-corporate conflicts. 3 In the context of close corporations,4 courts have
quietly abandoned those principles and replaced them with remedial
approaches which focus on the putative fiduciary's wrongful conduct.
The result is a subtle but significant change in the law's normative

aspirations from those on which classic fiduciary principles are
based.
The classic statement of the fiduciary principle is that, within the
scope of the relationship, the fiduciary is to act in a disinterested
manner in the beneficiary's best interests.5 Conduct deviating from
that standard results in liability, regardless of the fiduciary's motive
or intent.6 The problem burdening fiduciary analysis in the law of
close corporations is that those considered fiduciaries in close corporations are not, in fact, disinterested. They generally own significant,
if not controlling, amount: of the corporation's stock.7 Thus, the
fiduciary shares with the beneficiary a legitimate claim to the "trust"
property over which she has exclusive control.
Faced with this shared interest, the nature of corporate governance, including majority rule and the substantial latitude accorded
directors and officers in managing the corporation, 8 and the right of
remedies for corporate shareholders complaining of oppressive conduct by the
majority. See infra note 19.
3 See infra notes 47-213 and accompanying text.
4 This Article defines close corporations as those having a relatively small
number of shareholders. Shareholders in close corporations share three
characteristics: They tend to have a substantial portion of their personal wealth
invested in the corporation, to be intimately involved in its management, and to
restrict membership in the corporation. See Mitchell, Close CorporationsReconsidered, 63
TUL. L. REV. 1143, 1151 (1989). With regard to an analysis of fiduciary duty in close
corporations, the most important characteristic is the substantial involvement of
shareholders in management. Cf Anderson, supra note 1, at 759 (noting that the
"separation of ownership and control is the source of legal conflicts of interest").
5 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 (1959) (noting that the duty
of loyalty requires a fiduciary to act solely in the interest of the beneficiary); 2A A.
ScoTT & W. FRATCHER, supra note 1, § 170, at 311 (stating that a fiduciary is not
permitted to place herself in a position where it would benefit her to violate her duty
to the beneficiary).
6 See G. BOGERT & G. BOGERr, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 95, at 345
(5th ed. 1973) (holding that "[w]hether the trustee acted in good faith and with
honest intention is not relevant . . ."); see also AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson,
Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 115 (Del. 1986) ("[M]ere good faith will not preclude
a finding of a breach of the duty of loyalty . . . . [Tihe transaction can only be
sustained if it is objectively or intrinsically fair ....
).
7 See Mitchell, supra note 4, at 1144-45 (noting that the separation of ownership
and control in a close corporation is minimal if it exists at all).
8 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1983) (granting broad managerial
powers to the board of directors); ALI PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 3.02
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directors and officers, as shareholders, to consider their own selfinterest,9 courts largely have abandoned any attempt to distinguish
conduct undertaken in the best interests of the corporation and its
shareholders from that undertaken for the benefit of the controlling
interests. Problems concerning the adjudication of fiduciary liability
are compounded by the fact-specific nature 6f fiduciary analysis,
which diminishes predictability and consistency. Courts seeking
greater certainty and consistency have begun to use tests requiring
less subtle evaluations to determine when a fiduciary duty has been
breached.
The new tests, while often couched in fiduciary language,
require proof of some form of affirmative bad faith or intentional
misconduct by the fiduciary. 10 By shifting the inquiry from the beneficiary's best interests to a more limited focus on the fiduciary's malfeasance, these tests provide greater latitude than do traditional
fiduciary principles for corporate fiduciaries to pursue their own
interests, and diminish the power of the law to inspire and enforce
high standards of business ethics. They also change the function of
corporate fiduciary principles from a broad prophylactic measure to
a tool to remedy substantial misconduct. The important question
these observations raise is whether the new modes of analysis are
superior to fiduciary principles in guiding the conduct of corporate
actors and resolving intra-corporate disputes. The answer ultimately
turns on one's view of the desirable level of ethical conduct in close
the acceptability of the social vision underlying
corporations and
1
fiduciary duty. 1
(Tent. Draft No. 2 1984) (recommending broad powers for corporate board of
directors); REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Aar § 8.01(b) (1984) (stating that subject to
any limitations in the articles of incorporation, all.corporate powers shall be
exercisable by or under the authority of the board of directors); H. HENN & J.
ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BuSINESs ENTERPRISES § 242 (3d ed.
1983) (describing the "business judgment" rule which substantially insulates
management from liability for its actions).
9 See, e.g., Hetherington, Defining the Scope of Controlling Shareholders' Fiduciary
Responsibilities, 22 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 9, 12 (1987) [hereinafter Hetherington,
Defining the Scope] (noting that while corporate officials must act in accordance with
fiduciary principles, shareholders have traditionally owed no fiduciary obligations to
each other and have been free to act solely in their own self-interest).
10 Cf Hetherington & Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A Proposed Statutory
Solution to the Remaining Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. REV. 1, 11 (1977)
(discussing judicial dissolution statutes and noting that they require "[piroof of
fraud, illegality, waste, or misapplication of assets [that is] similar to that necessary to
prevail in a damage suit for breach of the fiduciary duties of loyalty or due care").
I I Legal analysis alone cannot provide the answer to this question. Legal
analysis can, however, identify the question, examine the current competing

1678

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 138:1675

Fiduciary analysis presents a singular problem in corporate law
generally. The self-interest of officers and directors in the corporation and its assets, 2 and the wide discretion granted them in the
performance of their jobs,"' have led courts to abandon any attempt
proposals, and suggest solutions. Cf Branson, Assault on Another Citadel: Attempts to
Curtail the Fiduciary Standardof Loyalty Applicable to Corporate Directors, 57 FORDHAM L.
REv. 375, 402 (1988) (criticizing the proposals of the American Law Institute's
Corporate Governance Project and the Model Business Corporation Act as being
guided by corporate, rather than public interest).
12 For instance, Chief Judge Seitz, a former Delaware chancellor, wrote in the
public corporation context:
It is frequently said that directors are fiduciaries. Although this statement
is true in some senses, it is also obvious that if directors were held to the
same standard as ordinary fiduciaries the corporation could not conduct
business. For example, an ordinary fiduciary may not have the slightest
conflict of interest in any transaction he undertakes on behalf of the trust.
Yet by the very nature of corporate life a director has a certain amount of
self-interest in everything he does. The very fact that the director wants
to enhance corporate profits is in part attributable to his desire to keep
shareholders satisfied so that they will not oust him.
Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999
(1981). The self-interest of corporate management often presents itself as a direct
conflict between the financial interests of the corporation and the manager. See, e.g.,
Anderson, supra note 1, at 758 ("[T]he economic interests of fiduciaries are frequently substantially affected by the discretionary decisions they make on behalf of
others, since... the magnitude of their own compensation for their services often
depends to an unusual degree on decisions which they themselves make."); Davis,
supra note 1, at 65 (noting the inevitability of conflicts of interest in the areas of
management compensation and responses to takeover bids). But see Fama, Agency
Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88J. POL. ECON. 288, 295 (1980) (arguing that "the
discipline imposed by managerial labor markets can resolve potential incentive
problems associated with the separation of security ownership and control of the
firm").
13 See supra note 8. By granting managers broad discretion, the business
judgment rule protects management in its risk taking function. See, e.g., Joy v. North,
692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982) (asserting that a purpose of the business judgment
rule is to guarantee against overly cautious corporate decisions), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1057 (1983). As an outgrowth of the directors' duty of care, the business judgment
rule is sometimes thought not to embody fiduciary principles. See, e.g., J.C.
SHEPHERD, supra note 1, at 49 (asserting that "the duty of care has absolutely no
necessary connection with fiduciary relationships"); DeMott, supra note 1, at 915
(noting that the duty of care is not fiduciary in character); Ruder, supra note 1, at
1385 (concluding that the business judgment rule is part of the general duty of care
and should not be treated in an article discussing the duty of loyalty). But see
Jacobson, supra note 1, at 622-23 (asserting that the fiduciary obligation includes a
duty to conduct the affairs of the beneficiary as a reasonably prudent person would
conduct her own affairs). The ri:sk-taking function is inevitably intertwined with
fiduciary doctrine given the impossibility in any given situation of neatly categorizing
directors' conduct as falling under either the duty of care or the duty of loyalty. Cf
Comment, Of Synergies of Evidence and Section 402(b)(1): Hanson Trust, Revlon, Van
Gorkom, and the Imminent Demise of te First Wave of CorporateDirectorLiability Statutes, 52
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to hold corporate fiduciaries to the same high standard of conduct
required of other fiduciaries. 4 The judicial and legislative response
has been the development of both procedural and substantive rules
that permit the sanitization of almost all self-interested transactions,
ALB. L. REV. 559, 589-94 (1988) (arguing that recent cases finding directors liable

have commingled duty of care and duty of loyalty analyses).
14 See Brudney, The Independent Director-Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95
HaRv. L. REV. 597, 607-08 (1982); Frankel, supra note 1, at 805-07; Hetherington &
Dooley, supra note 10, at 39; Ruder, supra note 1, at 1385; Scott, supra note 1, at 555
n.30.
Determining the salary levels of inside directors is an example of inherently selfinterested corporate fiduciary conduct and the consequent problems courts have in
analyzing its propriety. See, e.g., Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 591 (1933) (stating that
corporate by-laws may not allow salaries so large as to amount to spoilage or waste of
corporate property); Davis, supra note 1, at 84 (reasoning that because such
transactions are never at arm's length, the court cannot find a set of terms that
independent parties would have reached and must rely on abstract notions of
fairness); Ruder, supra note 1 at 1392-93 (noting that although executive
compensation is subject to review by the courts, it will not be deemed a breach of
duty unless it amounts to "spoliation or waste"). But see Fama, supra note 12, at 296304 (arguing that an efficient managerial labor market effectively regulates the
setting of management wages).
Cases involving the implementation of defensive measures against hostile
takeovers provide other examples of inherently self-interested conduct. See, e.g.,
Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 297 (7th Cir.) (refusing to impose
liability for both a defensive acquisition in the face of a hostile takeover bid and for
filing an antitrust suit against the hostile bidder), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981);
Johnson, 629 F.2d at 292-93 (affirming that under Delaware law a decision to adopt
defensive measures is protected by the business judgment rule unless solely or
primarily motivated by a desire to maintain control); Moran v. Household Int'l Inc.,
500 A.2d 1346, 1357 (Del. 1985) (refusing to impose liability for a poison pill plan);
Davis, supra note 1, at 80-82 (noting that, despite the criticism of the commentators,
most courts, under the business judgment rule, have protected directors' decisions to
take defensive measures); Ruder, supra note 1, at 1394 (noting that defensive
measures present a "mixed motive" problem that is difficult for the trier of fact to
resolve).
Opposing positions with regard to the appropriate scrutiny of directors' actions
in hostile takeovers are illustrated by the opinions of Judges Pell and Cudahy in
Panter. Compare Panter, 646 F.2d at 296-97 (holding that in the absence of proof by
the plaintiff of impermissible motive, the business judgment rule protects directorial
action in the face of a hostile takeover) with id. at 299-301 (Cudahy, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (arguing that when fighting hostile takeovers, directors
have a clear interest in self-preservation, and that the business judgment rule places
the burden of proof on the director to establish that the transaction was fair to the
corporation).
The pervasive psychological bias of directors towards management noted by Cox
and Munsinger suggests that all directorial conduct, to a greater or lesser extent, may
be self-interested. See Cox & Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological
Foundationsand Legal Implications of CorporateCohesion, 48 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83,
85-108 (1985). For a critical analysis of this and similar studies, see Davis, supra note
1, at 68-74. The problem of proving directorial self-interest lies at the heart of
Professor Shepherd's theory. SeeJ.C. SHEPHERD, supra note 1.
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although some extreme forms of selfish conduct flatly are prohibited. 5 These rules have stripped fiduciary principles of their traditional preventive function and normative content.
Although corporate law permits most self-dealing upon compliance with specific rules, with. respect to close corporations the courts
speak of fiduciary duty in a more general sense. Judges continue to
infuse fiduciary analysis in close corporation law with the ringing6
rhetoric of then-Judge Cardozo's opinion in Meinhard v. Salmon. 1
But it is increasingly rare that courts apply the principles underlying
that rhetoric. Rather, fiduciary analysis in close corporation law has
moved in three stages from the strict application of standards of loyalty, to judicial balancing of the legitimate interests of controlling
shareholders with those of the minority, to the contemporary treat17
ment of breach of fiduciary duty as intentional wrongful conduct.
The common law tort of freeze-out' 8 and the statutory remedy for
15 See Brudney, Fiduciary Ideoxogy, supra note 1, at 299, 300 (concluding that
functional concerns limit the use of fiduciary ideology in corporate law); Davis, supra
note 1, at 24, 51, 84 (noting that interested director transactions are subject to a
fairness standard); Ruder, supra note 1, at 1389-1402 (noting that extreme forms of
self-dealing, including abuse of parent-subsidiary relations, transactions unfair to
minority shareholders, excessive compensation, obstruction of takeovers primarily
for the purpose of entrenchment, sale of corporate office, insider trading, and
usurpation of corporate opportunities, are not permitted); see also Chiles v.
Robertson, 94 Or. App. 604, 625-39, 767 P.2d 903, 915-23 (finding a violation of
fiduciary duty on the part of directors of a parent corporation when they caused
subsidiaries to approve a transaction without considering the subsidiaries'
independent interests in the transaction), modified on other grounds, 96 Or. App. 658,
774 P.2d 500, review denied, 308 Or. 592, 784 P.2d 1099 (1989).
The paradigmatic procedural rules are those like DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144
(1983), which permit interested director transactions upon approval of a majority of
disinterested directors or shareholders. The paradigmatic substantive rule is the
fairness test which is applied in various situations, for example, in the context of a
parent-subsidiary merger. See, e.g., Alpert v. 28 Williams St. Corp., 63 N.Y.2d 557,
569-71, 473 N.E.2d 19, 26-27, 483 N.Y.S.2d 667, 674-75 (1984) (stating that fairness,
in the context of a freeze-out merger, includes fair price and fair dealing);
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983) (stating that when directors
of a Delaware corporation are on both sides of a transaction, that transaction must
satisfy the fairness test which consists of fair dealing and fair price). The fairness test
may also be invoked when a parent engages in self-dealing with a subsidiary. See
Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971).
16 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928). The omnipresence of Meinhard in
discussions of this topic has been noted. See, e.g., DeMott, supra note 1, at 891 n.56
(observing the prevalence of Meinhard's moral obligation language in case law and
commentaries on corporate fiduciary duty); Ruder, supra note 1, at 1386 (stating that
Meinhardcontinues to quoted by courts imposing corporate fiduciary obligations).
17 As I will show later, in Massachusetts, the entire progression occurred in the
span of only eleven years. See infra notes 98-168 and accompanying text.
18 See Sugarman v. Sugarman, 797 F.2d 3, 14 (Ist Cir. 1986).
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oppression' 9 are the principal guises in which this last stage has
occurred and are increasingly replacing fiduciary analysis as the
method of resolving internal close corporation disputes.2"
In this Article, I will attempt to demonstrate that in the course of
abandoning fiduciary principles for analyses requiring less subtle
evaluations, courts implicitly have rejected the assumptions on which
those principles were based as well as the vision of corporate ethics
embodied in those principles. Instead of encouraging high levels of
internal corporate conduct, courts now seem content to rely on "the
morals of the market place."'" The consequence is a significant dilution of fiduciary duty as an aspirational precept to guide the conduct
19 In this Article, I use the term "oppression statute" generically to denote
those statutes, adopted in approximately three-quarters of the states, that provide
remedies to shareholders who seek some form of judicial relief from the actions of
controlling shareholders. The typical statute provides relief upon a showing of
fraudulent, illegal, or oppressive conduct, although the precise terminology differs.
Notwithstanding differences in language, courts have tended to interpret the showing
required under these statutes in the same way. See infra notes 168, 196. For
examples of oppression statutes which apply specifically to shareholders of close
corporations, see GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-940 (1989); MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE
ANN. §§ 4-603 (1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751 subd. 2 (West Supp. 1990);
MONT.CODE ANN. § 35-9-501 (1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7 (West Supp. 1989);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-18-400 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 180.995(19) (West Supp. 1989). For studies of oppression statutes, see Cheffins,
The Oppression Remedy in CorporateLaw: The CanadianExperience, 10 U. PA.J. INT'L Bus.
L. 305 (1988); Hillman, The Dissatisfied Participantin the Solvent Business Venture: A
Considerationof the Relative Permanenceof Partnershipsand Close Corporations, 67 MINN. L.
REV. 1 (1982); Macdonald, CorporateBehavior and the Minority Shareholder: Contrasting
Interpretationsof Section 10-19.1-115 of the North Dakota Century Code, 62 N.D.L. REV. 155
(1986).
20 Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales, Inc., 73 N.Y.2d 183, 535 N.E.2d 1311, 538
N.Y.S.2d 771 (1989), discussed infra notes 201-13 and accompanying text, rather
explicitly suggests the exclusivity of the oppression mode of analysis in close
corporation law. See also Jordan v. Bowman Apple Products Co., 728 F. Supp. 409,
425-26 (W.D. Va. 1990) (finding Virginia oppression statute to be exclusive remedy
that preempts common law oppression remedies); Toner v. Baltimore Envelope Co.,
304 Md. 256, 273-80, 498 A.2d 642, 651-54 (1985) (rejecting plaintiff's common law
theory that directors of close corporations had a duty to offer minority shareholders
an equal opportunity to sell their shares because that theory was contrary to the
approach of Maryland's oppression statute); Sundberg v. Lampert Lumber Co., 390
N.W.2d 352, 356-57 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that the equitable remedy of
redemption under the common law of corporations has been limited to situations in
which the Minnesota oppression statute applies). Professor Cheffins has warned
courts in the United States of the need to keep analysis of oppression separate from
fiduciary analysis in close corporations. See Cheffins, supra note 19, at 337-38. As I
shall demonstrate, courts have failed to distinguish the analyses.
21 The phrase is from Cardozo's famous passage in Meinhard v. Salmon, 249
N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928) (discussed infra at notes 67-97 and
accompanying text).
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of corporate power holders in favor of rules protecting Holmes's
"bad man" from unintentionally incurring liability.2 2 The result is a
23
change in the goals of corporate law.
Before analyzing these developments, I will, in Part I of this
Article, set out the traditional parameters of the fiduciary relationship and its corresponding duty, and broadly identify the problems
arising from attempts to analyze close corporation relationships
within that context. In Part II, I will analyze courts' uses of fiduciary
principles in resolving conflicts within close corporations, and
demonstrate the subtle ways in which those principles have been
replaced. In Part III, I will analyze proposals by scholars to resolve
problems posed by fiduciary analysis in close corporation law, and
demonstrate that at the heart of the debate is a philosophical disagreement over the propriety of applying to close corporations the
norms underlying fiduciary principles. I will conclude by suggesting
that the appropriate way to resolve, and, more importantly, prevent,
close corporation conflicts is to impose fiduciary obligations on the
controlling shareholders in their exercise of power and on minority
shareholders in the exercise of their fiduciary rights, thus restoring
the prophylactic function of fiduciary obligation as a supplement to
existing remedies.
I.

IN SEARCH OF FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIPS

Before I analyze the fate of fiduciary analysis in close corporations, it is necessary to develop some general notions about what a
fiduciary relationship is. 24 In so doing, I conclude that at the heart
22 Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897).

23 Cf Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 10. Professors Hetherington and
Dooley write: "A free enterprise system is based on the assumption that optimal
allocation of resources will result from the individual decisions of resource owners
acting in their own perceived self-interests." Id. at 44. Perhaps. But the "resource
owners" of a close corporation are owners in common, and a divergence of these
interests may well split the firm, a.result which Professors Hetherington and Dooley
apparently believe desirable (or at least necessary) to facilitate.
24 The various theories propounded by scholars to identify and define fiduciary
relationships and the duties that flow from them differ in their emphasis. Professor
Shepherd sees the "essence" of fiduciary relationships as the notion "that powers are
a species of property ...." J.C. SHEPHERD, supra note 1, at 35-36. Professor Brudney
emphasizes the representational character of fiduciary relationships. See Brudney,
Fiduciary Ideology, supra note I, at 259-60. Professor Frankel focuses on the potential
for abuse of power by the fiduciary as the core problem, and defines the relationship
from that premise. See Frankel, supra note 1, at 797. In this sense, she and I share a
general conception of the fiduciary relationship. Similar to Professor Frankel's (and
to my) focus on the abuse of power is ProfessorJacobson's assertion that the essence
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of this legal construct lie two assumptions about human nature-that
persons can and will subordinate self-interest to the interests of
others, 25 and further that this is a social good the law can
of fiduciary relationships is "the shifting ofjudgment from one person to another."
Jacobson, supra note 1,at 620.
Professor Davis analyzes fiduciary duty in part as a function of its enforcement,
see Davis, supra note 1, at 3, but appears to define the broad notion of the fiduciary
relationship as being "the device employed to restrict . ..unfettered powers of
persons who are entrusted with control over the assets and affairs of others." Id. at 1.
Since he does not analyze this definition outside of the (to him) more important
defining context of enforcement, I will not belabor the point.
Although they seem to describe the duty flowing from the relationship more
than the relationship itself, Dean Clark identifies the following as the four "common
attributes of the fiduciary relationship": "affirmative duties to disclose," "openended duties to act," "closed-in rights to positional advantages," and "moral
rhetoric." Clark, supra note 1, at 71-76. Professor Anderson sees as the general
characteristics of a fiduciary relationship the decisionmaking power of fiduciaries, the
difficulty of subjecting those decisions to detailed standards, the frequent need for
specialized information in making those decisions, and the fiduciary's potential to
inflict losses on the beneficiaries. See Anderson, supra note 1, at 757-58.
Professor Scott describes a fiduciary relationship as one involving "a duty on the
part of the fiduciary to act for the benefit of the other party to the relation as to
matters within the scope of the relation." 2A A. Scorr & W. FRATCHER, supra note 1,
§ 2.5. In this relationship, "[i]t
is the duty of a trustee to administer the trust solely
in the interest of the beneficiaries." Id. § 170. Professor DeMott observes that "the
law of fiduciary obligation is situation-specific... " DeMott, supra note 1, at 879,
largely stemming from its equitable origins, see id. at 880. While she does not posit
her own definition of the fiduciary relationship, though the broad parameters of her
views are implicit in her criticisms of analogizing fiduciary duty to contract law, she
does state that "[i]n many relationships in which one party is bound by a fiduciary
obligation, the other party's vulnerability . ..justifies the imposition of fiduciary
obligation." Id. at 902.
Professor Weinrib takes a functional approach and views fiduciary duty as
performing the dual functions of controlling discretion and maintaining business
integrity. See Weinrib, supra note 1, at 150. He sees these two elements as forming
the "core" fiduciary concept of substantial discretion in the fiduciary which is
"capable of affecting the legal position of the principal." Id. at 1.
Professor Shepherd has catalogued the principal competing theories of fiduciary
duty. SeeJ.C. SHEPHERD, supra note 1, at 51-91; Shepherd, supra note 1, at 53-79. He
has also made what I believe to be a persuasive explanation of the law's failure to
clearly define the fiduciary relationship:
Of course, part of the reason for this is that the concept is unusually
difficult, being intrinsically non-rational. However, we must recognize
that our reluctance [to define fiduciary relationships] to a large extent
results from a fear that by defining the concept we will rob it of its
dynamics and therefore its soul.
J.C. SHEPHERD, supra note 1, at 3. Judge Cardozo's opinion in Meinhard v. Salmon,
249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928), discussed infra at notes 67-97 and accompanying
text, exemplifies this last statement.
25 Cf Hetherington, Defining the Scope, supra note 9, at 12 (stating that the
"[fiduciary] obligation [of majority shareholders] is based in part on the cynical but
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encourage. These assumptions are absent from the new methods of
analysis in close corporations.
A fiduciary relationship is a relationship of power and dependency in which the dependent party relies upon the power holder to
conduct some aspect of a dependent's life over which the power
holder has been given and accepted responsibility.2 6 The dependent, for a variety of reasons, has limited (or had limited for her)
27
control over one or more aspects of her personal or economic life.
The power holder is charged with assuming the power abdicated by
(or not granted to) the dependent in the manner she deems will best
fulfill her responsibility.2 8 The power holder has, in some sense, voluntarily undertaken the responsibilities with which she has been
charged.2 9 The dependent's reliance upon the power holder or, not
quite conversely, the power holder's service as a surrogate for the
dependent, characterizes the fiduciary relationship.
The power holder must do for the dependent what the latter
cannot, or will not, do for herself"0 Although this statement, shorn
of context-specific labels, describes all economic and many legal relationships, two principal aspects of the fiduciary relationship are distinctive. First, a great deal of discretion is vested in the power
holder. Except for the broad requirements of care and loyalty that
set the parameters of the power holder's authority (and, in part,
define the scope of her du:y), the power holder has complete freedom to conduct that segment of the dependent's life over which she
has been given responsibiity."1 Second, not only will the power
realistic assumption that elected officers, in exercising their discretionary authority,
will favor the interests of those whose votes elected them").
26 Professor Frankel uses the terminology of "power bearer" and "dependent"
to describe what she refers to as a "status relation." See Frankel, supra note 1, at 798.
I believe that this type of terminology applies to fiduciary relationships as well.
27 SeeJacobson, supra note 1, at 617-18.
28 See id. at 620; cf Anderson, supra note 1, at 757 (noting decision making
power of fiduciary); Frankel, supra note 1, at 809 (stating that "the fiduciary obtains
power from the entrustor or from a third party for the sole purpose of enabling the
fiduciary to act effectively" (footnotes omitted)); Weinrib, supra note 1, at 7
(observing that "the hallmark of a fiduciary relation is that the relative legal positions
are such that one party is at the mercy of the other's discretion").
29 See Frankel, supra note 1, at 820 (arguing that a fiduciary voluntarily assumes
her role); Shepherd, supra note 1,at 64-68 (criticizing fiduciary theory based
principally on undertaking); id. at 76 (accepting the requirement of an undertaking as
part of theory).
30 See Jacobson, supra note 1, at 617; cf Frankel, supra note 1,at 808-09
(describing some of the purposes for which a fiduciary relationship may be created).
31 See Weinrib, supra note 1, at 4; cf Anderson, supra note 1, at 757-58 (noting
difficulty of cabining a fiduciary's discretion and potential for a fiduciary to harm the
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holder have responsibility over a specific aspect of the dependent's
life, but in the typical fiduciary relationship, the dependent will be
precluded from exercising any control over that area.3 2
These central components of the fiduciary relationship 3 3 give
rise to certain duties. Because the dependent (or a third party
intending to benefit the dependent) is the source of the fiduciary's
power,3 4 and because the relationship permits the power holder to
control an aspect of the dependent's life, the power holder is oblibeneficiary); Jacobson, supra note 1, at 622-23 (arguing that the duties of loyalty,
care, and prudence bound the exercise of a fiduciary's discretion).
32 See Frankel, supra note 1, at 832 (discussing the inability of the entrustor to
protect herself). Compare Clark, supra note 1, at 57-58 (discussing the very limited
rights of participation possessed by shareholders in public corporations) with
Frankel, supra note 1, at 809-10 (focusing on the quantum of power granted to the
fiduciary rather than the exclusion of the dependent from the exercise of the powers).
The power of a principal to control her agent, see Clark, supra note 1, at 56, does
not invalidate this characteristic because, although the principal may control the
agent or even act within the area of delegated authority, this control or activity may
have limited effect, if any, on the agent's ability to bind the principal. See W. CARY &
M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 9-16 (6th ed. unabr. 1988)
(providing a summary of rules concerning an agent's power to bind a principal to an
agent's actions notwithstanding lack of authority to do so).
33 Although various theorists have identified the characteristics of fiduciary
relationships in a number of ways, I believe that my "central components" are the
irreducible minima of each of the theories. Of particular importance is the fact that
the commentators unanimously agree that the fiduciary is obligated to act in the
beneficiary's best interests. As to (i) the obligation of the fiduciary to act for the
beneficiary, see Clark, supra note 1, at 73; Davis, supra note 1, at 19; DeMott, supra
note 1, at 882; Frankel, supra note 1,at 808; Scott supra note 1, at 540; Shepherd,
supra note 1, at 75; Weinrib, supra note 1, at 4-5; (ii) the capacity of the fiduciary to
pursue this interest, see Jacobson, supra note 1, at 616 (stating that in the fiduciary
relation the actions of the fiduciary must "be prosecuted only by persons capable of
exercising judgment"); Davis, supra note 1, at 40-41 (analyzing commonality of
interests of "concentrated-constituency principals" as contrasted with "diffusedconstituency principals"); (iii) the delegation of the beneficiary's power or
responsibility to the fiduciary, see Brudney, FiduciaryIdeology, supra note 1, at 259-60;
Jacobson, supra note 1, at 619; Shepherd, supra note 1,at 77-78; cf.Frankel, supra note
1, at 800 (emphasizing dependence of the beneficiary on the fiduciary); (iv) the
transfer of power to the fiduciary, see Frankel, supra note 1, at 809; Jacobson, supra
note 1, at 616 n.48; Shepherd, supra note 1, at 75; (v) the fiduciary's volition in
entering into the relationship, seeJ.C. SHEPHERD, supra note 1, at 100-0 1; Scott, supra
note 1,at 540; cf.Clark, supra note 1, at 61-62 (describing "three grades of consent");
Jacobson, supra note 1, at 635 (noting that the fiduciary does not accept duty, rather
the law imposes it); (vi) the exercise of discretion by the fiduciary, see Anderson,
supra note 1, at 757-59; Clark, supra note 1, at 77; Weinrib, supra note 1, at 4; (vii)
extended duration of the relationship, see Frankel, supra note 1, at 817 n.62; (viii)
preclusion of the beneficiary from acting with respect to the delegated matter, see
Jacobson, supra note 1, at 617-18; cf.Clark, supra note 1, at 57-58 (discussing limited
ability of public corporation shareholder to participate in management).
34 But see Jacobson, supra note 1, at 621 (describing the source of fiduciary
obligation as the sovereign).
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gated to act in the dependent's interest, and not her own, in exercis35
ing that power.
The obligation of the power holder to act in the dependent's
best interests suggests an underlying assumption of fiduciary law,
that the power holder is able to act in the dependent's best interests.
Fiduciary principles are based on the assumption that the power
holder can put aside any personal interests in a given situation and
adopt a course of conduct designed exclusively to serve the best
interests of the dependent. These principles are based upon the further assumption that such persons will, in fact, do so. 3 6 Without
37
these assumptions, the prophylactic function of fiduciary duty
becomes impractical, and the enforcement of fiduciary duties is
35 See 2A A. ScorT & W. FRATCHER, supra note 1, § 170;Jacobson, supra note 1,
at 621; see also In re Hubbell, 302 N.Y. 246, 254, 97 N.E.2d 888, 891 (1951) (dealing
with fiduciary principle in trust context); Wendt v. Fischer, 243 N.Y. 439, 443-44, 154
N.E. 303, 304 (1926) (dealing with fiduciary principle in the agency context); Hoover,
Basic Principles Underlying Duty of Loyalty, 5 CLEV.-MARSHALL L. REv. 7 (1956); cf
Anderson, supra note 1, at 746 n.26 (noting frequent "strong moral overtones" in
descriptions of fiduciary duty); id at 759 ("In a fiduciary relationship, the client or
beneficiary depends on the fiduciary to an unusual degree to determine for the client
what his best interests are."); Weinrib, supra note 1, at 11 (identifying courts'
concern with "apparent immorality of the defendant's reaping where he had not
sown").
Judge Hoover reduced fiduciary duty to a "duty of disinterested judgment" and
identified two questions as a rule of thumb for detecting violations of this duty: "(1)
Does the trustee have a conflict of interest? and (2) Can the trustee render a
disinterested judgment?" Hoover, supra, at 10.
The requirement that the power bearer act in the dependent's best interests
does not mean that the power bearer must act as the dependent would have acted
were she exercising the power herself. If that were the case either the person
delegating the power would have circumscribed it by giving the power bearer specific
detailed directions for its exercise, or else she never would have delegated it. Cf.
Frankel, supra note 1, at 813-14 (explaining that beneficiaries are not able to exercise
control over fiduciaries); Weinrib, supra note 1, at 7 (asserting that if the fiduciary is
so bound by instructions so as to have no discretion, the fiduciary relationship cannot
come into being) . Rather, the power bearer is to exercise her authority in a manner
that, in her judgment, is calculated best to serve the dependent's interests.
36 See, e.g., Frankel, supra note 1, at 830 (stating that "[olnce a person becomes a
fiduciary, the law places him in the role of a moral person and pressures him to
behave in a selfless fashion, to think and act for others"). But seeJacobson, supra note
1, at 621-22 (arguing that it is impossible for the fiduciary to identify the beneficiary's
best interest, and that the fiduciary is therefore bound to protect "an interest
imputed to the beneficiary by public authority").
37 See, e.g., Lindenhurst Drugs, Inc. v. Becker, 154 111. App. 3d 61, 68, 506
N.E.2d 645, 650 (1987) (stating that the "prophylactic purpose of the rule imposing a
fiducipary obligation" is frustrated if directors fail to disclose a corporate opportunity
and exploit that opportunity for their own purposes (quoting Kerrigan v. Unity
Savings Assoc., 58 Il1. 2d 20, 28, 317 N.E.2d 39, 43 (1974))).
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doomed to regular litigation. Instead, the law assumes a high degree
of altruism on the part of the fiduciary.
When the fiduciary and the beneficiary share ownership interests
in the property around which the relationship centers, this basic
assumption becomes strained. 8 Of course, conflicts of interest will
often exist between individuals, and there is no reason to suspect
that this will change simply because a relationship is denominated as
fiduciary.3 9 The traditional solution of fiduciary analysis has been to
disqualify the fiduciary from receiving any benefits from the relationship. This relieves the fiduciary of having to balance her own inter4°
ests against those of her beneficiary and simplifies judicial analysis.
This solution reflects the view that requiring self-denial from the
fiduciary is a social good. The price of enforcing this standard, however, is some loss of efficiency, a consequence which may explain the
general trend in corporate
law away from strict fiduciary standards to
4
more permissive rules. '
Although efficiency loss may be the price of imposing strict fiduciary standards in the general corporate context, the approach
38 Professors Hetherington and Dooley believe that "[t]o expect the majority
not to take some advantage of the exploitative potential of its position is
unreasonable and unrealistic." Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 10, at 35.
39 Cf Anderson, supra note
1, at 738 ("All individuals who engage in
transactions with others have conflicts of interest-conflicts between self-interest and
their legal duties to other persons." (footnote omitted)).
40 See DeMott, supra note 1, at 882. Professor Scott suggests that fiduciary
relationships vary in intensity. See 2A A. Scorr & W. FRATCHER, supra note 1, § 170;
Scott, supra note 1, at 541. In Scott's view, the intensity of the duty varies with the
"independent authority to be exercised by the fiduciary." Id.; see also Renz v. Beeman,
589 F.2d 735, 744 (2d Cir. 1978) (distinguishing in the context of a trust the
circumstances under which the lesser duty of good faith will be applied from those in
which a strict duty of loyalty applies). Scott, however, also states that it is basic to
fiduciary duty that the fiduciary act in the beneficiary's best interests. See 2A A. Scorr
& W. FRATCHER, supra note 1, §§ 170, 170.25; see also Michoud v. Girod, 45 U.S. (4
How.) 502, 554 (1846) (in a case concerning the fiduciary's purchase of entrusted
property, stating that "[t]he general rule stands upon our great moral obligation to
refrain from placing ourselves in relations which ordinarily excite a conflict between
self-interest and integrity"); cf. Renz, 589 F.2d at 745 ("Absent exculpation or clear
consent, it is the existence of the conflict alone that establishes the obligation."). As
described in Renz, the duty varies between an "undivided loyalty" standard and a
standard of good faith, with the latter permitting the courts to examine the merits of
a transaction. See id. at 744-45. It is this latter good faith standard which is most
frequently expressed in close corporation cases. I will show, however, that this
standard has been eroded further in corporate law to the point where a fiduciary has
complied with her duty as long as there is an absence of bad faith. See infra notes 47213 and accompanying text.
41 See Bulbulia & Pinto, Statutory Responses to Interested Directors' Transactions: A
Watering Down of Fiduciary Standards?, 53 NOTRE DAME LAW. 201, 203-04 (1977);
Brudney, Fiduciary Ideology, supra note 1, at 261 n.8.
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presents a more serious problem in close corporations. The application of strict fiduciary standards to close corporations deprives controlling shareholders of tfhe ability to manage the corporation-to
use their own property-as they see fit. Because of the apparent
unfairness of this result and the difficulty courts face in distinguishing actions taken in the best interests of the corporation and shareholders from those which impinge unfairly on the minority,4 2 courts
have begun to reverse the analysis and require the power holder simply to avoid "low" levels of conduct. 4 3 Ultimately this represents an

abandonment of the prophylactic function of fiduciary duty and its
underlying assumptions.4 4
Although judges increasingly depart from fiduciary analysis in
resolving close corporation conflicts, they nevertheless have been
reluctant to abandon fiduciary terminology. 45 This trend may dilute
fiduciary principles generally as they apply in other contexts. In
addition, it obscures the underlying philosophical changes reflected
in the new tests and results in misdirected normative evaluations of
those tests. Finally, it suggests that the terminology implies a standard of conduct from which courts overtly are reluctant to depart,
46
even if the actual resolution of disputes is based on other factors.
Thus, in Part II, I will refine my analysis of the problems that fiduciary duty causes in close corporations, trace the transformation of
fiduciary principles, and explain the new vision of corporate ethics
now embodied in fiduciary rhetoric.

II. FIDUCIARY ANALYSIS IN CLOSE CORPORATIONS
In the application of fiduciary principles in corporate law, there
has been a clear tendency to move from the broad articulation of
42 See Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 10, at 39 (explaining that the majority
will vote out managers who have breached their fiduciary duty).
43 See infra notes 165-213 and accompanying text.
44 See infra notes 98-164 and accompanying text.
45 For an insightful explanation of this trend, see Chiles v. Robertson, 94 Or.
App. 604, 619-20, 767 P.2d 903, 911-12 (1989). For examples of cases equating
"oppression" with breach of fiduciary duty, see infra note 169. See also Macdonald,
supra note 19, at 171 (noting that the expanded definition of"[o]ppression became a
more attractive avenue for relief" with courts beginning "to acknowledge that if the
controlling shareholders breached their fiduciary duty to the minority shareholders,
oppression resulted").
46 Professor Weinrib's theory of a primary and secondary policy underlying
fiduciary duty, with the latter being the maintenance of the integrity of business
institutions, provides an interesting explanation of this phenomenon. See Weinrib,
supra note 1, at 3-15; see also Clark, supra note 1, at 75-76 (describing the moral
rhetoric often employed in judicial opinions dealing with fiduciary duty).
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fiduciary principles applicable to directors and controlling shareholders to the formulation of transactional rules that work to balance
the interests of controlling persons with those of minority shareholders.4 7 The trend, however, has lagged in the law of close
corporations.
The corporate law fiduciary rules applicable to public corporations generally apply equally to close corporations. For example, the
corporate opportunities doctrine,4 8 statutes dealing with interested
director transactions and other forms of self-dealing, 49 rules governing freeze-out mergers, 50 and the general anti-fraud provision of
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,51 all apply to close corpo47 See Marsh, Are Directors Trustees?-Conflict of Interest and Corporate Morality, 22
Bus. LAW. 35, 36-43 (1966). In this well-known article, Mr. Marsh traces the
development of fiduciary rules governing transactions between a corporation and a
director or her affiliate, and shows the progress from pure prohibition of such
transactions in the classic fiduciary manner to contemporary legislation permitting
such transactions upon compliance with statutory procedures. An issue exists under
these statutes, however, as to whether substantive fairness to the corporation must be
demonstrated even given the fact of procedural compliance. The commentary to the
Revised Model Business Corporations Act appears to envision application of the
fairness test only when the statutory procedures have not been followed. See REV.
MODEL BusINESS CORP. ACT § 8.31 official comment 1 (1984); see also Branson, supra
note 11, at 387 (arguing that the American Bar Association is attempting to negate
the duty of loyalty of directors); Bulbulia & Pinto, supra note 41 (examining
interested director statutes); Davis, supra note 1, at 50-52 (noting that doctrines like
informed consent have "operat[ed] to waive the pure prohibition" of certain
transactions and that courts have eased "the level of judicial scrutiny to ad hoc
fairness review"). The development of balancing tests in close corporations is
discussed later. See infra notes 98-164 and accompanying text.
48 See Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch, 73 F.2d 121, 123-24 (2d Cir. 1934); Klinicki
v. Lundgren, 298 Or. 662, 663, 695 P.2d 906, 907 (1985); Guth v. Loft, 23 Del. Ch.
255, 5 A.2d 503, 510-12 (1939). But see Brudney & Clark, A New Look at Corporate
Opportunities, 94 HARV. L. REV. 997, 1000, 1006-22 (1981) (noting "that different
considerations and rules should be employed for close corporations than for publicly
held corporations" in applying the corporate opportunities doctrine, and proposing
specific guidelines for the doctrine's application); Note, Corporate Opportunity in the
Close Corporation-A Different Result?, 56 GEO. LJ. 381, 388-91 (1967) (arguing for
special and separate treatment of close corporations under the law of corporate
opportunities).
49 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1983); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 713
(McKinney 1986); ALI PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 5.02 (Tent. Draft
No. 5 1986); REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.31 (1984).
50 See, e.g., Alpert v. 28 Williams St. Corp., 63 N.Y.2d 557, 568-69, 473 N.E.2d
19, 25-27, 483 N.Y.S.2d 667, 673-74 (1984) (stating that "[a]s a general matter" all
corporate directors have a duty of fair dealing in merger decisions); cf Leader v.
Hycor, Inc., 395 Mass. 215, 222-23, 479 N.E.2d 173, 177 (1985) (stating that the duty
of "utmost good faith and loyalty" applies to directors of close corporations).
51 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988). Application of the Securities and Exchange Act to
close corporations is discussed in Brudney, Fiduciary Ideology, supra note 1, at 289-94.

1690

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 138:1675
I

rations. The fiduciary rules of corporate law address situations in
which potential conflicts of interest (omnipresent between directors
and shareholders) become actualized.5 2 These situations, and therefore the rules, are exceptional, because they depart from the ordinary legal freedom of directors to manage or supervise the
corporation's business.5 3 Normally business decisions, such as product development and new investments, do not present these conflicts
and therefore are unimpeded by fiduciary rules. Distributional decisions, such as the payment of dividends and the redemption of stock,
present a different opportunity for self-serving conduct in that they
might be resolved disproportionately. These situations, however,
are relatively easy to identify and correct.5 4
Close corporations, though, present a special problem. Close
corporation shareholders tend to have invested substantial personal
wealth in the enterprise, 5 magnifying the consequences of any business decision as to a particular shareholder. Thus, any meaningful
distinction between business decisions and distributional decisions
becomes more difficult to make.5 6 Given significant stock ownership
by close corporation management,5 7 the potential for conflicts of
interest between director shareholders and non-director shareholders, or even among director shareholders themselves, over a given
decision (business or distributional) is pervasive. 5" While in the public issue corporation we still might talk about the best interests of the
corporation, if for no other reason than as a shorthand for the lowest
common denominator of shareholder interest, 59 in the paradigmatic
See generally Ruder, supra note 1, at 1398-99 (discussing application of the Securities
and Exchange Act).
52 See J.C. SHEPHERD, supra note 1, at 339.
53 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1983).
54 Courts, at times, have been unable or unwilling to recognize that differences
between close corporations and publicly held corporations may require a reexamination of certain corporate doctrines. For example, the distinction between
business and distributional decisions becomes more difficult to make in the close
corporation context; yet, the law has not fully recognized and addressed the problem.
See Chittur, Resolving Close Corporation Conflicts: A Fresh Approach, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 129, 152-65 (1987).
55 This is generally accepted as one of the defining characteristics of close
corporations. See Mitchell, supra note 4, at 1151.
56 See Chittur, supra note 54, at 152-65.
57 A further accepted defining characteristic of close corporations is some
congruity between ownership and management. See Mitchell, supra note 4, at 1151.
58 1 discuss in another article the problem of lawyers' conflicts of interest in the
context of counselling close corporations and their shareholders. See Mitchell,
ProfessionalResponsibility and the Close Corporation: Toward a Realistic Ethic, 74 CORNELL
L. REV. 466 (1989).
59 See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 506-07, 170 N.W. 668, 684

1990)

DEATH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY

1691

close corporation no discernable corporate interest exists apart from
the individual interests of the shareholders at any given point in
time.6 ° In the absence of any regulatory mechanism, internal disagreements degenerate into power struggles. 61
As long as corporate distributions are proportional, or the
shareholders agree that a particular business decision (including the
decision to make a given distribution) is desirable, the interests of
the power holder and the dependent will be congruent and no problem will arise. When distributions are disproportionate, or when
business interests diverge, however, the dependent may feel that the
power holder's conduct is contrary to her best interests. The problem is compounded when the power holder/decisionmaker has no
specialized knowledge, or no greater expertise than the dependent/
minority shareholder, or when the decision requires no such specialized knowledge or expertise. 6 2 In such situations, there is no reason
to suppose that the power holder can make a decision regarding the
dependent's best interests better than the dependent herself.6 3
Thus, without an expectation or requirement that the power holder
subjugate her ownjudgment to that of the dependent, extra-judicial
dispute resolution becomes
a simple power struggle, with the weaker
64
side inevitably losing.
(1919) (stating that courts must defer to directors' business decisions because
"judges are not business experts"); cf Branson, supra note 11, at 387-88 (arguing that
the ABA amendments to the Model Business Corporation Act have excluded from
the definition of "conflicting interest transactions" many transactions that "by
common sense usually involve conflicts of interest" thereby resulting in the reduction
of business morality to the lowest common denominator).
60 See generally Chittur, supra note 54.
61 Cf Branson, supra note 11, at 377 (stating that "without articulated brackets
around private ordering, the legal boundary presumably is simple majoritarian
shareholder rule").
62 For an illustration of the difficulty of resolving problems in this context, see
Smith v. Atlantic Properties, Inc., 12 Mass. App. Ct. 201, 422 N.E.2d 798 (1981),
discussed infra notes 154-64 and accompanying text.
63 The diminished importance of expertise and specialization of function in
close corporations, see Fama &Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims, 26J. LAw &
EcoN. 327 (1983), is strong support for the argument that the business judgment
rule should not be applied in that context, see Chittur, supra note 54, at 129; see also
Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 10, at 2 (noting the relative ease with which close
corporation shareholders can monitor the corporation's affairs).
64 This is a slight overstatement. The dependent will have the informal
opportunity to persuade the power bearer of the correctness of her view although
she lacks means within the corporate structure to effect that view. She is, in other
words, reliant upon the good faith of the power bearer to see that a given course of
action does not unfairly affect her. Cf Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 10, at 5
("In close corporations, the majority is in a position to cause a wealth transfer to
itself from the minority at any time.").
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Fiduciary duty provides standards designed to mediate this
power struggle. 65 But confronted with the same problem of balancing legitimate competing interests faced by close corporation shareholders, and the fact that traditional rules of corporate governance
giving control to the majority apply to close corporations, courts
have retreated from attempts to enforce high standards of fiduciary
conduct. Instead they have begun to ratify the actions of the more
powerful party, unless the minority can demonstrate bad faith or
willful misconduct.6 6
In this section, I will analyze the traditional understanding of
fiduciary duty typified by the classic case of Meinhard v. Salmon.
Then, I will develop the three stages of fiduciary analysis in close
corporations, starting with the classic application, progressing to the
balancing of interests stage, and concluding with the current stage
defining breach of fiduciary duty as affirmative misconduct. In doing
so, I will thereby show how the problem of fiduciary analysis in close
corporations has led courts to transform fiduciary principles into
actions resembling intentional tort.
A.

Fiduciary Duty as Moral Precept-The Theme of
Meinhard v. Salmon

Perhaps the most potent influence on the early development of
fiduciary principles in close corporation law, and the classic exposition of that duty as moral precept, is Judge Cardozo's opinion in the
1928 case of Meinhard v. Salmon.6 7 Although Meinhard is the oldest
war-horse in the repertoire of corporate fiduciary duty and is often
quoted,6 8 it is rarely analyzed. Its important influence on the devel65 An action for breach of fiduciary duty is only one of several actions available
to a complaining shareholder. See Hillman, supra note 19, at 38-39 (listing variety of
actions for relief available to minority shareholders). Part of the problem this Article
seeks to address is the extent to which the independent action for breach of fiduciary
duty has been subsumed analytically within these other remedies.
66 Shepherd suggests that it is not the "intentions of the oppressor that are
relevant, but the effect of the oppressor's actions on the minority." J.C. SHEPHERD,
supra note 1, at 369. As should be clear from the preceding discussion, I believe that
this does not substantially aid fiduciary analysis in close corporations and is
inconsistent with actual judicial treatment. I do believe, however, that his
observation leads in the right direction.
67 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928).
68 DeMott describes Meinhard as "[p]robably the example [of cases using the
language of moral obligation in applying fiduciary principles] best known to lawyers
in the United States .... " See Demott, supra note 1, at 891 n.56; see also Ruder, supra
note 1, at 1386 (quoting Meinhard in his general description of the duty of loyalty).
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opment of the law6 9 dictates fresh analysis before proceeding to
examine that development.
Meinhard did not involve a corporation at all, but a joint venture
between Morton Meinhard and Walter Salmon for the purpose of
leasing, altering, and managing a piece of commercial real estate in
New York City for a term of twenty years. Salmon had located the
property and invited Meinhard to join him, on terms whereby Meinhard would supply half the requisite funds and receive a portion of
the profits. "Salmon, however, was to have sole power to 'manage,
lease, underlet and operate' the building."7 ° The relationship established thus exhibits the characteristics of a fiduciary relationship:
Meinhard delegated to Salmon the exclusive power to regulate a
portion of Meinhard's economic life for a period of years. It also
exhibits the intractable problem of close corporation relationships:
Salmon, the fiduciary, had a substantial economic interest in this very
same project.
Toward the end of the lease term, Salmon, unbeknownst to
Meinhard, entered into a new agreement with the property's owner
not only to continue to lease the property,7" but also to lease adjacent properties. The new twenty year lease was subject to three successive renewals, ultimately extending the lease to eighty years.7 2
The court held that Salmon's failure to disclose the existence of
this new opportunity to Meinhard was a breach fiduciary duty. "The
trouble about his conduct [was] that he excluded his coadventurer
from any chance to compete, from any chance to enjoy the opportunity for benefit that had come to him alone by virtue of his agency.
73
This chance, if nothing more, he was under a duty to concede.",
Consequently, the court imposed a constructive trust on the new
lease entitling Meinhard to his pro rata share of the proceeds of the
new venture upon payment of his share of the expenses.7 4 The court
did not deny that Salmon's interest in the new project was legitimate.
Nor did it hold that that interest was subordinate to Meinhard's or to
See DeMott, supra note 1, at 891 n.56.
Meinhard, 249 N.Y. at 462, 164 N.E. at 546.
It does not appear from the facts described in the opinion that the lease was
renewable. Rather, Cardozo viewed the project as a "preemptive opportunity" that
was an "incident of the enterprise." See id. at 464, 164 N.E. at 547.
72 See id. at 463, 164 N.E. at 546.
73 Id at 465, 164 N.E. at 547.
74 See id. at 469, 164 N.E. at 548-49. It is not clear in what capacity Meinhard
was a fiduciary. Although Cardozo said it was as "managing coadventurer," id. at
468, 164 N.E. at 548, his reference to agency in the previously quoted sentence
suggests the possibility that Meinhard's fiduciary role was as an agent.
69
70
71
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that of the joint enterprise. Rather, it held that, at a minimum, each
party had an equal right to be informed of, and independently compete for, the new project.
More significant than the facts or the holding of the case is the
language Cardozo used to describe the duty. Of course no duty at all
would apply unless Salmon were a fiduciary, a fact that Cardozo
quickly established 75 over Judge Andrews's dissent. 76 Having done
so, he turned to the scope of the duty. On the facts of the case, he
simply could have analogized to the doctrines of partnership opportunity and corporate opportunity and held that because the new
lease was sufficiently similar to the old, Salmon was obligated to
acquire it for the joint venture. 7 7 Instead, Cardozo imposed the far
less demanding duty of disclosure on Salmon. 78 In doing so, however, Cardozo expressly eschewed any opportunity to delimit the
duty with specific rules: "Equity refuses to confine within the bounds
of classified transactions its precept of a loyalty that is undivided and
unselfish. ' '79 Instead he interdicted Salmon's conduct by applying
broad fiduciary principles, elegantly articulated in this now famous
passage:
Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, while the
enterprise continues, the duty of the finest loyalty. Many forms of
conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm's
length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties .... Not
honesty alone, but the punctilio
of an honor the most sensitive, is
80
then the standard of behavior.
Of equal importance to the breadth of this standard is Cardozo's
assertion of judicial willingness to apply it strictly:
75 See id. at 462, 164 N.E. at 546.

76 Judge Andrews conceded that a fiduciary relationship existed between
Meinhard and Salmon within the scope of the joint venture, but appeared to base his
analysis more on contractual principles (particularly evidenced by his focus on the
parties' intent) narrowly circumscribing the scope of the venture, than on broader
fiduciary principles. See id. at 472-80, 164 N.E. at 549-52 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
77 The Appellate Division'appears to have applied this reasoning. See Meinhard
v. Salmon, 223 A.D. 663, 667, 229 N.Y.S. 345, 349 (1928), modified, 249 N.Y. 458, 164
N.E. 545 (1928); see also Mitchell v. Reed, 61 N.Y. 123, 129 (1874) ("It has long been
settled by adjudications that generally when one partner obtains the renewal of a
partnership lease secretly, in his own name, he will be held a trustee for the firm, in
the renewed lease.").
78 In so doing, Cardozo expressly refused to address the question of what
Salmon's duty would have been had he disclosed the new lease to Meinhard. See
Meinhard, 249 N.Y at 464-65, 164 N.E. at 547.
79 Id. at 467, 164 N.E. at 548.
80 Id. at 463-64, 164 N.E. at 546.
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As to this there has developed a tradition that is unbending and
inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of
courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the 'disintegrating erosion' of particular exceptions. Only thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries been kept
at a level higher than that trodden by the crowd. 81
It will not consciously be lowered by any judgment of this court.
It no longer matters whether Meinhard was correctly decided on
the facts of the case. What does matter is Cardozo's establishment of
two general principles in a case that did not require the announce-

ment of these principles: (i) fiduciary duty is a moral precept of the
highest order; and (ii) no exceptions to that duty will be entertained.8 2 Also significant is the influence this opinion has had on the

application and development of fiduciary principles and corporate
law.
The rhetoric of the opinion, rather than its technical holding,
causes the problems.8 3 It is broad, moralistic, and goes far beyond
that necessary to find a simple breach of a duty to disclose.8 4 This

duty would be fairly limited and would provide a bright-line standard
81 Id. at 464, 164 N.E. at 546 (citation omitted). But cf Ingle v. Glamore Motor
Sales Inc., 73 N.Y.2d 183, 189, 535 N.E.2d 1311, 1314, 538 N.Y.S.2d 771, 774
(1989) (suggesting that no fiduciary relationship exists among close corporation
shareholders); Gallagher v. Lambert, 74 N.Y.2d 562, 565-67, 549 N.E.2d 136, 13637, 549 N.Y.S.2d 945, 945-46 (1989) (same); Schwartz v. Marien, 37 N.Y.2d 487,
492, 335 N.E.2d 334, 338, 373 N.Y.S.2d 122, 127 (1975) (adopting business purpose
test).
82 Cardozo had previously expressed similar ideas. See B. CARDOZO, THE
NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 133-34 (1921) ("What really matters is this, that
the judge is under a duty, within the limits of his power of innovation, to maintain a
relation between law and morals, between the precepts ofjurisprudence and those of
reason and good conscience."); id. at 109-10 (distinguishing the judge's role in
enforcing morality-laden doctrines like fiduciary duty from other legal principles).
83 Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel criticize similar "rhetoric" in
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975), see infra
notes 103-28 and accompanying text, for obscuring clear analysis and being
impossible to administer. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency
Costs, 38 STAN. L. REv. 271, 294-95 (1986). While I agree with their analysis of
Donahue, see infra note 151, I believe their problem is more with the underlying
philosophy expressed by that rhetoric than with its analytical paucity, see DeMott,
supra note 1, at 881-82 ("As a result of... history, the development of the adjective
law of fiduciary obligation is inseparably a part of the obligation's substantive
content." (footnote omitted)).
84 It is worth noting, in support of Cardozo's indignation, that construction of
Grand Central Terminal, a mere two blocks from the subject property, was begun the
year after Meinhard and Salmon began their relationship and was completed during
the original lease term. See COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, THE NEw COLUMBIA
ENCYCLOPEDIA 2931 (4th ed. 1975).
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for the fiduciary's conduct. Cardozo, however, clearly viewed active
compliance with fiduciary norms as a moral imperative. 8 5 The language expressing these norms is aspirational and studiously imprecise. The very ambiguity of the language conveys its moral content
as the court's refusal to set lines is designed to discourage marginal
conduct by making it difficult for a fiduciary to determine the point at
which self-serving conduct will be prohibited, and thus to encourage
86
conduct well within the borders.
One of the most perceptive and articulate acknowledgments of
this aspirational function of Meinhard's language is Judge Warren's
87
opinion for the Oregon Court of Appeals in Chiles v. Robertson:
Issues of whether a corporate officer or controlling shareholder has
fulfilled fiduciary duties have arisen in a number of circumstances
and have led to the creation of various specific rules. Courts, however, are not willing to say that a fiduciary fulfills its duties simply
by following those rules. Opinions pile phrase upon phrase in
what appears to some observers to be a mere compilation of platitudes. Yet those platitudes express something deeper; they are a
judicial attempt to emphasize that the heart of a corporate fiduciary's duty is an attitude, not a rule. The fiduciary best fulfills its
duties if it approaches them with the attitude of seeking the beneficiary's interests rather than the personal interests of the fiduciary,
88
not if it simply tries to follow rules codified from past decisions.
See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
Professor Hetherington is highly critical of the "vehemence" of this
language, claiming it arises from the difficulty courts have in delineating the
boundaries of fiduciary duty. See Hetherington, Defining the Scope, supra note 9, at 11.
He misses the point that this language is, in some sense, perfectly descriptive of
fiduciary duty and is designed to enhance its prophylactic function. See DeMott, supra
note 1, at 881 (discussing the development of the fiduciary duty in equity).
Hetherington's treatment of fiduciary duty as remedial is the cause of his error. See
Hetherington, Defining the Scope, supra note 9, at 11. Hetherington notes that:
"Where content and limits of rules are clear, one need only state the rule." Id. at 11.
One is left to wonder which rules of law Professor Hetherington believes to be selfexecuting. For further criticism of Hetherington's views, see infra notes 233-43 and
accompanying text.
87 94 Or. App. 604, 767 P.2d 903, review denied, 308 Or. 592, 784 P.2d 1099
(1989).
88 Id. at 619, 767 P.2d at 911.12 (citations omitted). Judge Warren goes on to
quote "the passage" from Meinhard. See id. at 619-20, 767 P.2d at 912. In this
respect, the Meinhard opinion exemplifies Weinrib's secondary policy of fiduciary
duty as maintaining business integrity. See Weinrib, supra note I, at 9-15 (discussing
the breadth of fiduciary duty law in protecting the integrity of commercial
organizations); see also 2A A. ScoT & W. FRATcHER, supra note 1, § 170.25 (quoting
Meinhard v. Salmon in a discussion of the fiduciary duties of trustees); Frankel, supra
note 1, at 829-32 (dealing with the moral content of fiduciary duty). For a polemical
exposition on the moral implications of the duty of loyalty, see Hoover, supra note 35.
85

86
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It is difficult to inspire and enforce this attitude when, in fact, it is
expressed by a "compilation of platitudes," butjudicial analysis actually occurs on a different plane.8 9 In close corporations, courts have
bowed before the practical difficulties of enforcing this attitude
against fiduciaries who have an interest in the subject property.90
The practical difficulties are not especially evident in Meinhard.
The new lease entered into by Salmon was not a transaction in the
ordinary course of business, nor would it have any effect upon the
way in which the business of his joint venture with Meinhard was
conducted. Thus it would be difficult to argue that Salmon's actions
were in any way designed to further the interests of the joint venture,
let alone Meinhard as the beneficiary of a fiduciary duty. Salmon's
actions had no apparent motive other than self-interest. Therefore,
the case does not present the practical problems of fiduciary analysis
that exist where the fiduciary with a common interest in the property
arguably acts in the interests of the beneficiary while benefiting
himself.
If Meinhard were taken simply for its narrow holding, the
absence of these practical problems would make the case doctrinally
insignificant. The broader purposes for which it is cited, however,
cause both practical and doctrinal problems when the challenged
actions or transactions are less obviously self-interested, less completely independent of the ordinary course of business, and when the
fiduciary's conduct is arguably beneficial to the enterprise as a whole.
It is clear that trustees are prohibited from self-dealing in trust property, and that non-trustee fiduciaries have been subjected to the
same general principle. Extension of this principle to corporate
directors poses no theoretical problem for, as directors, they owe
duties to the corporation they serve and its shareholders, not to
themselves.9 " Extension of this duty to corporate directors who are
also significant shareholders, however, does present a problem. As
directors, their duties are to the corporation. As shareholders, they
are also beneficiaries of the duty owed by the directors to the corpo89

Cf Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 83, at 295 (arguing that the court's "zeal

to articulate a strict standard of fiduciary duty to protect minority shareholders in
closely held corporations led it to ignore the reasons for fiduciary duties").
90 See, e.g., Chiles, 94 Or. App. at 620, 767 P.2d at 912 ("Our primary focus... is

necessarily on the specific rules that courts have created in the process of applying
the implications of the fiduciary attitude .... No rule, however, can substitute for the
'punctilio of an honor the most sensitive.' "(quoting Meinhard, 249 N.Y. at 464, 164
N.E. at 546)).
91 See H. HENN &J. ALEXANDER, supra note 8, §§ 235, 240.
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ration. 2 Meinhardpresents significant problems in this context when
the conflict involves necessary business and distributional decisions,
such as the employment of personnel and the payment of dividends,
which, given the organization's structure, inevitably will involve benefit to the fiduciary as well as the beneficiary.
When a close corporation pays a dividend or redeems stock, the
distribution will accrue to the benefit of controlling shareholders as
well as minority shareholders. 9 3 When the corporation employs a
controlling shareholder for a salary, she will receive a benefit which
may not be available to all shareholders. The decisions made may
well have different, and sometimes adverse, effects on different
shareholders. For example, the tax effect of a particular distribution
might be more adverse to one shareholder than to another, or the
opportunity to obtain a salary from the corporation may be distributed unequally. The Meinl.ard principle cannot simply require the
disclosure of such transactions, since the minority shareholders will
be powerless to change the outcome or otherwise protect
94
themselves.

In order to be effective in close corporations, the Meinhardprinciple must require more than a duty of disclosure. But what? Does
application of the broad Meinhard principle require that controlling
shareholders of close corporations must, in such instances, subjugate
their own interests to those of the other shareholders? And how is
92

SeeJ.C. SHEPHERD, supra note 1, at 366-67.

93 As the cases show, sometimes distributions accrue only to the benefit of

controlling shareholders. See, e.g., Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270, 277
(Alaska 1980) (finding that "director's fees" beyond the reasonable value of services
rendered may be constructive dividends resulting in a benefit to the majority
stockholder without a corresponding benefit to the minority). Another possibility is
that "in a corporation with a single class of shares, the control shareholder possibly
could recapitalize and reorganize the corporation by creating a new class of shares
with dividend preferences, and issuing the new class to himself. Thereafter, the
control shareholder could pay dividends only to the shares with preference."
Comment, Valuing Closely Held Stock: ControlPremiums and Minority Discounts, 31 EMORY
L.J. 139, 162 n.90 (1983).
94 Cf Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209, 218-20 (2d. Cir. 1977) (holding that
failure by directors to disclose their alleged breach of fiduciary duty was actionable
under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 since disclosure would have
enabled plaintiff shareholders to bring an action to enjoin the alleged breach), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978).
Disclosure and approval by the minority would provide meaningful protection,
but this solution might give too great a measure of control to the minority. Cf Smith
v. Atlantic Properties, Inc., 12 Mass. App. Ct. 201, 207-09, 422 N.E.2d 798, 802-03
(1981) (discussed infra notes 154-64 and accompanying text). Disclosure and
approval requirements also present the problem of identifying those business
decisions that would require such ratification.
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the problem resolved when all of the shareholders have a measure of
control? How is each to discharge her fiduciary duty to the others?
The answer given by contemporary courts appears to be that this
fiduciary duty is discharged simply by avoiding blatant and intentional unfairness to the minority. Although courts generally describe
this duty as one of fairness 95 or utmost good faith and loyalty,9" the
analysis employed and results achieved are quite different from those
in traditional fiduciary analysis.9 7 As an examination of the cases
shows, the courts are increasingly abandoning application of fiduciary principles with respect to close corporations.
B.

The Dilemma of FiduciaryDuty in Close Corporations:
An Irrepressible Conflict

A good starting point for analyzing the recent jurisprudence of
fiduciary duty in the close corporation context is the famous Massachusetts trilogy, Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co.,9" Wilkes v. Springside
Nursing Home, Inc.,9 9 and Smith v. Atlantic Properties, Inc. °° These
cases, occurring within a period of only six years, illustrate the first
95 See, e.g., Harman v. Masoneilan Int'l, Inc., 442 A.2d 487, 492 (Del. 1982)
(concluding that a majority shareholder occupies a fiduciary relationship to minority
shareholders "from which springs a duty of fairness"); Alpert v.28 Williams St.
Corp., 63 N.Y.2d 557, 569, 473 N.E.2d 19, 26, 483 N.Y.S.2d 667, 674 (1984)
(transaction viewed as a whole must be fair to minority shareholders).
96 See, e.g., Burt v. Irvine Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 828, 850, 47 Cal. Rptr. 392, 406
(1965) (holding that majority owes to minority shareholders "a duty of highest good
faith"); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983) (concluding that
those in control of the corporation must demonstrate "their utmost good faith");
Lirosi v. Elkins, 89 A.D.2d 903, 906, 453 N.Y.S.2d 718, 722 (1982) (stating that a
majority shareholder owes the minority shareholder "a duty of the utmost good
faith").
97 Cf Afterman, Statutory Protectionfor Oppressed Minority Shareholders: A Model for
Reform, 55 VA. L. REV. 1043, 1061 (1969) (" 'Good faith' under section 210 [of the
English Companies Act, dealing with oppression,] apparently stresses concepts of
impropriety and overreaching which are analogous, if not identical to, the notion of
fairness.").
98 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975). For a good analysis of Massachusetts
case law preceding Donahue, see Note, Contractual Disclaimer of the Donahue Fiduciary
Duty: The Efficacy of the Anti-Donahue Clause, 26 B.C.L. REV. 1215, 1218-22 (1985). See
also Recent Development, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 986, 997-1008 (1976) (discussing
fiduciary duty in close corporations before and after Donahue).
99 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657 (1976).
100 12 Mass. App. Ct. 201, 422 N.E.2d 798 (1981). Smith is an appeals court
decision and therefore of less precedential value than Donahue and Wilkes. Although
the Supreme Judicial Court has not expressly affirmed Smith, its discussion of that
case in Zimmerman v. Bogoff, 402 Mass. 650, 657-58, 524 N.E.2d 849, 853-54
(1988), without critical comment, is consistent with my view, see infra text preceding
note 164, that Smith is a correct application of Wilkes and Donahue.
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two stages of close corporation fiduciary analysis. Each of the cases
deals with the controlling group's alleged breach of its fiduciary
duty ' 1 ' to the powerless shareholder as a result of corporate action
or inaction traditionally within the sole discretion of the board of
directors. Each case stands for the proposition that, regardless of
the capacity of the persons owing the duty, the duty is owed to the
shareholders (although whether it is owed in addition to, or instead
of, to the corporation, is unclear).1 ° 2 Ultimately, from the relatively
modest beginnings of Donahue, the cases work a radical change in the
philosophy and function of fiduciary analysis in the close corporation
context.
In Donahue, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
adopted the broad principle of Meinhard as the fiduciary standard
applicable to shareholders of close corporations.'0 3
Donahue
involved a challenge to Rodd Electrotype's repurchase of a majority
of the shares of Harry Rodd, its retiring director, president, and former controlling shareholder, leaving the corporation in the management of Rodd's children who, as a group, controlled a majority of the
101 The cases often fail to identify clearly the capacity of the person owing the
duty, in other words, whether the duty is owed by a director, officer, or shareholder.
See, e.g., Chiles v. Robertson, 94 Or. App. 604, 627, 767 P.2d 903, 916 (1989) (stating
that "[d]istinctions between the duties of directors and the duties of controlling
shareholders are simply irrelevant"); J.C. SHEPHERD, supra note 1, at 366 n.87 ("In
the closely held company, these roles [director, officer, and shareholder] are simply
irrelevant."). Distinguishing among these roles is not particularly important because
of the lack of separation of ownership and control in close corporations. The
distinction is significant, however, for determining whether the action is properly
brought in the name of the complaining shareholder or as a derivative suit.
102 Again the distinction may be important for determining the form of the
action. See supra note 101. For cases holding that directors and/or controlling
shareholders in close corporations owe a fiduciary duty to the minority shareholders,
see Jones v. Ahmanson, 1 Cal. 3d 93, 108, 460 P.2d 464, 471, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592, 599
(1969) ("Majority shareholders may not use their power to control corporate
activities to benefit themselves alone or in a manner detrimental to the minority.");
Comolli v. Comolli, 241 Ga. 471, 475, 246 SoE.2d 278, 281 (1978) (stating that
majority shareholders owe a fiduciary duty to minority); Cookies Food Products, Inc.
v. Lakes Warehouse Distributing, Inc., 430 N.W.2d 447, 451 (Iowa 1988) (same). But
see Grant v. Winstead, 476 So. 2d 36, 40 (Ala. 1985) (stating that there is no fiduciary
duty owed by a director, officer, or shareholder to another director/shareholder
when the latter is in a position to protect her own interests adequately); Ingle v.
Glamore Motor Sales, Inc., 73 N.Y.2d 183, 189, 535 N.E.2d 1311, 1314, 538
N.Y.S.2d 771, 774 (1989) (stating that no "duty of loyalty and good faith" precludes
termination by a controlling shareholder of a close corporation of a shareholder's
employment with the corporation).
103 See Donahue, 367 Mass. at 594-95, 328 N.E.2d at 516.
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corporation's stock." 4 Euphemia Donahue sued to rescind the
repurchase, 10 5 alleging that the action breached the directors' fiduciary duty to her' 0 6 since she was not accorded an "equal opportunity
'0 7
to sell her shares to the corporation."'
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the court's holding is its
conclusion "that stockholders in the close corporation owe one
another substantially the same fiduciary duty in the operation of the
enterprise that partners owe to one another."' 0'
The court
described this duty as one of "'utmost good faith and loyalty,"'
which means that such stockholders "may not act out of avarice,
expediency or self-interest in derogation of their duty of loyalty to
the other stockholders and to the corporation."' 0 9 As later cases
demonstrate, the difficult problem is determining when a fiduciary's
self-interested actions are "in derogation of [her] duty of loyalty."
The court imposed this duty due to the fiduciary characteristics
of the intra-corporate relationship." 0 But the court also implicitly
recognized the controlling shareholders' legitimate interests in the
corporate property and the problem of restricting shareholder fiduciaries too severely in their ability to benefit from these interests:
We stress that the strict fiduciary duty which we apply to stockholders in a close corporation ...governs only their actions relative to

the operations of the enterprise and the effects of that operation on
the rights and investments of other stockholders. We express no
104 Rodd gave the balance of his shares as gifts to his children. See id. at 582,
328 N.E.2d at 510.
105 See id. at 584, 328 N.E.2d at 511.
106 See id. at 579, 585, 328 N.E.2d at 508, 511.
107 Id. at 585, 328 N.E.2d at 511.
108 Idt at 593, 328 N.E.2d at 515.
109 Id. (quoting Cardullo v. Landau, 329 Mass. 5, 8, 105 N.E.2d 843, 845
(1952)). An interesting and difficult problem presented by this case is the court's
failure to identify the fiduciary beyond the control group generally. Although this is
not a problem in Donahue, where the members of the control group were related and
appeared to share common interests, it is difficult to determine when this group
fiduciary concept is to be applied to less cohesive control groups. See infra note 132
and accompanying text; see also Recent Development, supra note 98, at 1015
(discussing the definition of a community interest).
110 See Donahue, 367 Mass. at 586-93, 328 N.E.2d at 512-15. Fora discussion of
these characteristics, see supra notes 24-46 and accompanying text. These
characteristics include the reliance of each of the stockholders on the others' "fidelity
and abilities," Donahue, 367 Mass. at 587, 328 N.E.2d at 512; see also J.C. SHEPHERD,
supra note 1, at 56-60 (discussing reliance theory of fiduciary duty), the minority's
vulnerability to oppressive action by the majority, see Donahue, 367 Mass. at 588-92,
328 N.E.2d at 513-14; Frankel, supra note 1, at 809-16 (focusing on abuse of power),
and the difficulties of proof faced by the minority in establishing self-serving conduct,
see Donahue. 367 Mass. at 589-90, 328 N.E.2d at 513-14.
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opinion as to the standard of duty applicable to transactions in the
shares of the close corporation when the corporation is not a party
to the transaction. I
Unfortunately, while the court seemed to recognize the problem of
inherent conflicts of interest, it failed to recognize the reality of close
corporations: the substantial congruity of corporate actions with the
actions of controlling shareholders. It also failed to indicate the limits, if any, of this strict fiduciary duty." 2
The difficulty with the court's failure fully to appreciate the realities of close corporations becomes clear upon analysis of its holding:
"We hold that, in any case in which the controlling stockholders have
exercised their power over the corporation to deny the minority such
equal opportunity [to sell their shares to the corporation], the minority shall be entitled to appropriate relief. '
This rule is simple,
clear, apparently easy to apply, and seems to fit the facts of the case.
But when combined with the realities of close corporations, the
rule's difficulties become obvious. In the first place, although clearly
consistent with Meinhard, it goes beyond the duty of disclosure
imposed in that case by requiring equality in the opportunity of
shareholders to benefit from the use of corporate property. Of
course, imposition of a requirement of disclosure would be meaningless in Donahue. In Meinhard, Salmon's disclosure of the opportunity
would have given Meinhard the chance to compete for it. Mrs. Donahue, however, as a minority shareholder, had no power to alter the
challenged transaction. The equal opportunity rule is consistent
with the principles of Meinhard by, in effect, eliminating the disparity
in power by mandating the opportunity to participate.' 14 Unlike the
III Id. at 593 n.18, 328 N.E.2d at 515 n.18.
112 This reality, however, was appreciated by Judge Wilkins's concurrence. See
id. at 604, 328 N.E.2d at 521 (Wilkins, J., concurring); see also Dynan v. Fritz, 400
Mass. 230, 242 n.17, 508 N.E.2d 13S71, 1378 n.17 (1987) (indicating that the Donahue
duty, which it incorrectly characterized as a "duty of care," did not necessarily apply
in a derivative action "where the alleged wrong sought to be redressed is to the
corporation... and not to some portion of the stockholders, [although] [t]he two
concepts tend to merge ... when a shareholder's alleged self-aggrandizement, if
true, hurts both the corporation and the interests of the other stockholders"). In
Bessette v. Bessette, 385 Mass. 806, 434 N.E.2d 206 (1982), in which minority
shareholders sought to recover excessive salary payments to controlling
shareholders, the Massachusetts Superior Court distinguished Donahue by holding
that, where the relief sought properly accrued to the corporation (as in Besselte), the
proper method of recovery was through a derivative suit. See id. at 808-09, 434
N.E.2d at 207-08.
113 Donahue, 367 Mass. at 600, 328 N.E.2d at 519.
114 Cf Brudney, Fiduciary Ideology, supra note 1, at 261 n.7 (noting the two
methods of implementing fiduciary restrictions: categorical denial and offsetting the
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situation in Meinhard, however, the action of the power holder in
Donahue had utility beyond the simple gratification of the power
holder's selfish interest. And therein lies the problem.
Not every corporate repurchase of stock would so clearly evidence self-dealing on the part of the control group as (arguably) did
the repurchase in Donahue." 5 Clearly legitimate business purposes
may be served by encouraging or facilitating the retirement of an
officer or director who offers no further utility to the corporation, or
who simply wants to retire and has no further interest in the corporation's activities. Given the nature of close corporations and the typicality of a shareholder's large investment of personal wealth in the
corporation, 1 16 it is likely that such a shareholder would need her
capital returned in order to fund her retirement, and that the ulti17
mate best interests of the business would be to return her capital.'
Application of the equal opportunity rule in Donahue to all corporate
repurchases, however, would make every retirement of a controlling
shareholder the opportunity for effective dissolution.' " It is difficult
to imagine this result serving the best interests of the enterprise. So
the problem of identifying the circumstances in which the unequal
distribution of corporate assets would be consistent with fiduciary
duty, of defining "loyal inequality" as it were, continues to exist." 19
fiduciary's "advantages of position"); Hetherington, The Minority's Duty of Loyalty in
Close Corporations, 1972 DUKE LJ. 921, 946 [hereinafter Hetherington, Duty of Loyalty]
(stating that "[iloyalty is ... the surrogate for control").
115 For example, in Leader v. Hycor, Inc., 395 Mass. 215, 479 N.E.2d 173
(1985), the SupremeJudicial Court upheld the recapitalization of a corporation by its
control group for the purpose of eliminating public minority shareholders. It should
be noted that the lower court decision affirmed by the Supreme Judicial Court
treated the corporation as a close corporation, despite the presence of public
shareholders, a distinction the SupremeJudicial Court found unnecessary to address.
See id. at 222, 479 N.E.2d at 177. On the other hand, in Dynan v. Fritz, 400 Mass.
230, 244, 508 N.E.2d 1371, 1379 (1987), a derivative action in which the court held
that an agreement between the corporation and its controlling shareholder to
repurchase that shareholder's shares at a price dictated by the controlling
shareholder and approved by a fully interested board was voidable by the
corporation unless a majority of the disinterested shareholders approved the
transaction. Cf. Toner v. Baltimore Envelope Co., 304 Md. 256, 263, 498 A.2d 642,
646 (1985) (declining to apply a per se prohibition to selective stock repurchases by a
close corporation).
116 See supra note 4.
117 See, e.g., Toner, 304 Md. at 276, 498 A.2d at 652 (discussing circumstances
under which such a stock repurchase might be in the best interests of the company).
118 See Recent Development, supra note 98, at 1012.
119 Easterbrook and Fischel are highly critical of the court's failure to appreciate
the propriety of the repurchase in Donahue, suggesting that it did not take into
account the reasons for fiduciary duties, which they believe to be providing a low
transaction cost on the basis of contractual terms for which the parties would have
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Neither the rule nor the broader opinion resolves this question.
In fact, the opinion later casts doubt on whether unequal distribution
of corporate assets is per se a breach of fiduciary duty. 2 0 Massachusetts law denied preemptive rights to stockholders unless provided in
the charter or a shareholder-adopted by-law. Since the repurchase
obligation established by the court is the functional inverse of preemptive rights, the court evidently felt the need to deal with this
issue:' 21

We do not here suggest that such preemptive rights are required
by the strict fiduciary duty applicable to the stockholders of close
corporations. However, to the extent that a controlling stockholder or other stockholder, in violation of his fiduciary duty, causes

the corporation to issue stock in order to expand his holdings or to
dilute holdings of other stockholders,
the other stockholders will
1 22
have a right to relief in court.
This is curious. It suggests that an essential aspect of the breach of
fiduciary duty is the increased concentration of power by the controlling stockholder. It is also illogical since the controlling stockholder
already, by definition, controls the corporation.' 3 To the extent
negotiated had they done so. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 83, at 294-95. As
I explain in Part III, I believe that it is Easterbrook and Fischel who fail to understand
the reasons for fiduciary duties. See infra notes 215-42 and accompanying text.
120 See Donahue, 367 Mass. at 600 n.25, 328 N.E.2d at 519 n.25.
121 It is not clear why the court dealt with this issue as there was no change in
the identity of the control group nor was there any potential change in Mrs.
Donahue's pro rata share of the corporation's earnings or assets. See Donahue v.
Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 1 Mass. App. Ct. 876, 876, 307 N.E.2d 8,
9 (1974) (noting no "significant change in the ultimate control of the corporation"),
rev'd, 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975).
122 Donahue, 367 Mass. at 600 n.25, 328 N.E.2d at 519 n.25 (emphasis added);
see also Ski Roundtop, Inc. v. Hall, 202 Mont. 260, 276-81, 658 P.2d 1071, 1080-83
(1983) (holding that disproportionate purchases of stock by a controlling
shareholder from the corporation to obtain and maintain control were not in breach
of his fiduciary duty when the result of his control was demonstrably beneficial to the
corporation).
123 See Dynan v. Fritz, 400 Mass. 230, 236-37, 508 N.E.2d 1371, 1375 (1987)
(reversing a lower court holding that certain sales of stock by the corporation to
defendants were improper when one of the defendants already was, and remained, in
control of the corporation); see also Toner v. Baltimore Envelope Co., 304 Md. 256,
275, 498 A.2d 642, 651-52 (1985) (holding that the corporation's repurchase of stock
which increased the controlling shareholder's voting interest from 50% to 51%
could not have injured minority stc.ckholder); Baker v. Standard Lime & Stone Co.,
203 Md. 270, 284, 100 A.2d 822, 829 (1953) (affirming dismissal of minority
stockholder challenge to corporation's purchase of its own shares, on the grounds
that the resulting change in control was not adverse to the minority's interests
because "[t]hey lost no voting power by the transaction . . . [since they] were and
remain minority stockholders").
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that the breach of fiduciary duty consists of the controlling stockholder's increase in her pro rata share of the corporation's earnings
and assets,1 24 it is irrelevant to the case since no such increase
occurred there.' 25 Although selective issuances of stock could result
in such an increase, the footnote states that such a concentration or
dilution is grounds for relief only if undertaken in breach of a fiduciary
duty. 126
This formulation is problematic for two reasons. First, it calls
into question the scope of the court's equal opportunity rule. Perhaps not every corporate action that disproportionately affects shareholders is a per se breach of fiduciary duty. Second, it leaves
unanswered the question of when such a breach of fiduciary duty has
occurred.' 27 The explanation for the logical defects in Donahue is
that fiduciary analysis is not necessarily logical, nor is it intended to
be. Rather, its purpose is, in part, to express and, when necessary, to
enforce community norms regarding the ethical standards of business conduct.' 28 But Donahue still leaves unanswered the question of
the parameters of those norms.
The question of when a breach of fiduciary duty has occurred is
answered in Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc. 12 9 a case which
124 As a matter of finance theory, the use of corporate funds to effect the
repurchase, a fact which obviously troubled the court, caused no harm to Mrs.
Donahue. See infra note 145 and accompanying text; see also Herbik v. Rand, 732
S.W.2d 232, 234-35 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (issuance of shares by corporation at less
than alleged fair market value was not oppressive conduct under Missouri statute
where preemptive rights of each shareholder were protected and there was no
showing that the minority shareholders were unable to purchase their pro rata
share).
125 Cf Toner, 304 Md. at 275, 498 A.2d at 652 (minority shareholder's interest
was not injured by corporation's repurchase of stock because her stock was
nonvoting and that purchase increased the value of her interest upon liquidation).
126 See Donahue, 367 Mass. at 600 n.25, 328 N.E.2d at 519 n.25; see also Ski
Roundtop, Inc. v. Hall, 202 Mont. 260, 658 P.2d 1071 (1983).
127 It may be that such a breach occurs only when corporate assets are used,
which would be consistent with the holding and facts in Donahue. But this is not likely
to be the case in new share issuances. Conversely, in many cases of disproportionate
treatment, such as employment, it will always be the case that corporate assets are
used. But see Forinash v. Daugherty, 697 S.W.2d 294, 304-05 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985)
(finding, despite the non-use of corporate assets, a breach of fiduciary duty by the
officers and directors of a close corporation when they sold their non-controlling
shares to one individual, thus creating a controlling shareholder, who subsequently
mismanaged the corporation).
128 See, e.g., B. CARDOZO, supra note 82, at 43-50 (discussing the limits of logic in
judicial reasoning).
129 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657 (1976). The method of analysis in Wilkes was
also adopted in a New York case decided contemporaneously with Donahue. See
Schwartz v. Marien, 37 N.Y.2d 487, 335 N.E.2d 334, 373 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1975).
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exemplifies the second stage of fiduciary analysis in close corporations. Four shareholders (including Wilkes) owned an equal number
of shares in Springside Nursing Home, Inc. For a number of years,
the four served as the corporation's directors and officers, and
received an equal salary for their services. After a falling-out with
one of the shareholders, Wilkes was denied a place on the board as
well as corporate employment (and, consequently, his salary) in contravention of an arrangement followed from the time of incorporation. 3 0 Wilkes sued for declaratory judgment establishing breach by
the other three shareholders of an alleged partnership agreement or,
alternatively, of their fiduciary duties to him as controlling
shareholders.'

31

As in Donahue, the court treated the group of shareholders
opposed to Wilkes as "the fiduciary," based upon their aggregate
control of the corporation. Following Donahue's concern with the
potential in close corporations for the majority to deny the minority
any financial benefits, realized in this case by the denial of employment and salary to Wilkes, the court held that the "group fiduciary"
1 32
owed a duty to Wilkes, a duty it had breached.
The relationship appears to be fiduciary in nature, for the same
reasons discussed in Donahue. The corporation was an aspect of
Wilkes's economic life. The three controlling shareholders, assuming a commonality of interest, were charged with its conduct, exclusive of Wilkes. Thus the power holder/dependent relationship
clearly existed. But again, the power holder had a legitimate selfinterest in the aspect of the dependent's life over which it held sway.
And the facts in Wilkes, dealing as they do with the ordinary business
decision of corporate employment, present a much clearer dilemma
than did Meinhard and Donahue, which arguably involved, respectively, the taking and selective distribution of corporate property.
The existence of an intractable and legitimate conflict of interest
hampers the analysis of the fiduciary's performance and complicates
analysis of the fiduciary's motives.
Obviously, the decision to employ an individual is a business
130 See Wilkes, 370 Mass. at 844-48, 353 N.E.2d at 659-61. It is noteworthy that
the corporation never declared or paid a dividend. See id. at 850 n.13, 353 N.E.2d at
662 n.13.
131 See id. at 843-44, 353 N.E.2d at 659. Not the least interesting aspect of this
case is the way the court treated as irrelevant the distinction between corporate and
partnership law. See id. at 848, 353 N.E.2d at 661. Such treatment gave the case a
decidedly contractual tint.
132 See id. at 852-53, 353 N.E.2d at 664.
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133
decision generally entrusted to a corporation's board of directors.
Equally obviously, it cannot always be a breach of fiduciary duty, even
in a close corporation, to refuse or cease to employ a particular
shareholder in the business,134 just as the court in Donahue seemed to
recognize that it cannot always be a breach of fiduciary duty selectively to repurchase a shareholder's stock.' 3 5 The problem is compounded in the close corporation context by the court's implicit
recognition that such a "corporation" in reality has no interest of its
own apart from that of the individual shareholders, each of whom
will expect some benefit from the corporation that may be inconsistent with the benefits expected by other shareholders.' 36 As the
Wilkes court put it: "The majority, concededly, have certain rights to
what has been termed 'selfish ownership' in the corporation which
should be balanced against the concept of their fiduciary obligation
to the minority."' 3 7
So how can a court determine that the action of one group of
shareholders to benefit themselves is a breach of fiduciary duty to the
minority? The answer, according to Wilkes, depends upon "whether
the controlling group can demonstrate a legitimate business purpose
133 See, e.g., ALI PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE §§ 3.01, 3.02 (Tent.
Draft No. 2 1984).
134 See, e.g., Streb v. Abramson-Caro Clinic, 401 So. 2d 410, 414 (La. Ct. App.)
(holding a minority shareholder's allegations insufficient to establish breach of
fiduciary duty where majority shareholder terminated minority shareholder's
employment), cert. denied, 403 So. 2d 69 (La. 1981); Harris v. Marden Business Sys.,
Inc., 421 N.W.2d 350, 354 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that majority shareholder
in close corporation owes no fiduciary duty to employees, even if employees are
minority shareholders in the corporation, and thus there is no breach of fiduciary
duty when majority shareholder fires employee for legitimate business purpose);
Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., Inc., 167 N.J. Super. 141, 155-56, 400 A.2d
554, 561-62 (1979) (finding no breach of fiduciary duty where close corporation
terminated minority shareholder's employment because of unsatisfactory
performance), aff'd, 173 NJ. Super. 559, 414 A.2d 994, cert. denied, 85 NJ. 112, 425
A.2d 273 (1980); Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales, Inc., 73 N.Y.2d 183, 188-90, 535
N.E.2d 1311, 1313-14, 538 N.Y.S.2d 771, 773-74 (1989) (finding no breach of
fiduciary duty when majority shareholders of a close corporation terminated the
employment of a minority shareholder whose employment was not governed by an
express agreement of duration or conditions of employment).
135 See supra note 117-19 and accompanying text; see also Toner v. Baltimore
Envelope Co., 304 Md. 256, 498 A.2d 642 (1985); cf. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 956-58 (Del. 1985) (permitting selective repurchases
of stock by corporation as part of a tender offer defense).
136 Cf Mitchell, supra note 58, at 479-80 (noting that in close corporations,
individual shareholders attempt to realize their personal goals through the
enterprise, and those goals may be inconsistent with the goals of the close
corporation as a whole).
137 Wilkes, 370 Mass. at 850-51, 353 N.E.2d at 663 (citations omitted).
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for its action." 131 If such a purpose is demonstrated, the challenged
action presumptively is not a breach of fiduciary duty, unless the
minority can "demonstrate that the same legitimate objective could
have been achieved through an alternative course of action less
harmful to the minority's interests."' 39 In Wilkes, the majority
demonstrated no legitimate business purpose. Consequently, the
court held that the majority breached its fiduciary duty. 140
This is a truly remarkable transformation of fiduciary doctrine.
In Donahue, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court adopted as
the fiduciary standard governing close corporation shareholders the
lofty aspirations of Judge Cardozo and the New York Court of
Appeals in Meinhardv. Salmon. 141 I have already noted the alogical,
unyielding nature of the fiduciary standard seemingly articulated in
Donahue. Yet only fifteen months later, in Wilkes, the same court
announced that this unyielding principle would indeed yield against
the press of the fiduciary's business goals. Strikingly, the court held
that not only would the principle yield, but further that whether any
breach of fiduciary duty had occurred was to be analyzed by means of
a balancing test.
The concept of balancing is wholly inconsistent with the broad
notion of fiduciary duty and its expression in Meinhard and Donahue. 142 Balancing provides a complete shift in focus from the classic
fiduciary examination of whether the action taken was in the beneficiary's best interests to a mode of analysis that centers on the fiduciary's interest. Thus, fiduciary conduct is now analyzed by examining
whether the fiduciary had a motive other than to harm the benefici138

Id. at 851, 353 N.E.2d at 663 (citations omitted).

139 Id. at 851-52, 353 N.E.2d at 663 (citations omitted).
140 See id.at 852, 353 N.E.2d at 663 (observing that "it is apparent that the
majority stockholders in Springside have not shown a legitimate business purpose").
141 See supra text preceding note 103.
142 See Brudney, Fiduciary Ideology, supra note 1, at 270 ("Strict fiduciary
considerations would make any... legitimate business purpose irrelevant ....
").But
see Hetherington, Definingthe Scope, supra note 9, at 13, 14 (limits to fiduciary duty "are
the working out of a balancing of interests among the participants in corporate
enterprises").
The only apparent consequence of establishing a fiduciary relationship in Wilkes
is the shifting of the burden of proof to the fiduciary. Of course, the proof that the
fiduciary must offer is not of selfless devotion, or even fairness, but simply of a
business purpose, which should generally be easy to establish. Once this purpose is
established, the burden of proof shifts back to the dependent. Thus, the real issue is
going to be the legitimacy of the majority's business purpose, an inquiry courts are
quite reluctant to undertake.
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ary, rather than whether the fiduciary acted in the beneficiary's best
3
14

interest.

In reality, the Wilkes rule is not so stark as this. Rather, it shifts
the burden from the fiduciary who has demonstrated a legitimate
business purpose to the beneficiary who, to prevail, must then
demonstrate that the majority could have achieved its business goal
through methods less harmful to the beneficiary. This approach
could exact a price in efficiency by requiring controlling interests to
structure transactions in a more expensive manner to avoid harm to
the minority. But it is consistent with traditional corporate governance principles, rather than strict fiduciary principles, in that it
implicitly equates the best interests of the minority with the best
interests of the corporation, as determined by the majority.14 4 The
Wilkes rule returned the resolution of close corporation disputes
largely to a power struggle between majority and minority, with the
minority inevitably losing absent some evidence that the majority
completely disregarded or intentionally damaged the minority's
interests. In so doing, it set the groundwork for the third stage of
development of fiduciary analysis.
I do not mean to suggest that the problem is a simple one, or
that the Massachusetts court was irrational in designing its solution.
But the difficulty of resolving these conflicts by application of the
Wilkes test can be demonstrated by applying that test to the facts of
Donahue, and then to a hypothetical problem based upon the facts of
Wilkes.

In Donahue, a clearly legitimate business purpose existed: the
smooth and uneventful retirement of Harry Rodd. As indicated in
my discussion of that case, it is reasonable to assume that Rodd
needed his capital returned in order to finance his retirement, or at
least that he was unhappy with the prospect of leaving a substantial
portion of his wealth invested in a business over which he desired to
exercise no further control. The most (if not only) effective way to
achieve this was to have either the corporation or the remaining
shareholders purchase his shares. If the latter course were pursued
(which it wasn't), the purchasing shareholders would have had to use
their own capital, but the net effect (financial and in terms of control)
on Mrs. Donahue would have been no less harmful than if the corpo143

Cf Hillman, supra note 19, at 45 (noting that the "traditional" definition of

oppression focuses more on the actions of the majority than on the impact on the
minority).
144

Chittur has pointed out the ease with which a defendant could justify a given

transaction in terms of legitimate business interests. See Chittur, supra note 54, at 153.
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ration had engaged in the repurchase.' 4 5 So, while a purchase by the
controlling shareholders would have had the simple advantage of
avoiding the use of corporate funds, it would ultimately have been
inconsequential to the minority. The only less intrusive means to
accomplish that business purpose would have been to provide Mrs.
Donahue the opportunity to purchase a pro rata portion of Harry's
shares, and the cases cited by the Donahue court support this remedy.' 4 6 Thus, application of the Wilkes test to Donahue seems to produce the same result, which is consistent with the reasoning in
Donahue and its reliance on Meinhardv. Salmon.
What, however, would be the result in Wilkes if the termination
of Wilkes had been found to have a legitimate business purpose?
Assume, for example, that Wilkes had a specialized skill, for example
masonry, which was no longer needed by the corporation, and that
Wilkes possessed no skills which could be used profitably by the corporation. Assume further that the corporation was having financial
difficulties such that it could not pay dividends. Could the directors,
consistent with their fiduciary duties, terminate Wilkes's
employment?
The answer must be yes. But both the question and the answer
pose an interesting dilemma, highlighted by the apparent focus of
the Wilkes court on the fiduciary duty of the control group as shareholders rather than as directors. 147 As directors and controlling
shareholders, the defendants have a duty to the corporation. Consistent with that duty, Wilkes's employment would have to be termi145 This is true, at least theoretically, because the diminution in outstanding
shares that actually occurred in Donahue concentrated the earnings to be distributed
among a fewer number of shares. Of course this also assumes that the expenditure of
corporate funds on the repurchase did not diminish the corporation's earning
capacity and that the repurchase itselfwas a good investment for the corporation. See
Recent Development, supra note 98, at 1008-09 (discussing the equal opportunity
doctrine whereby all shareholders must be afforded the opportunity to participate in
stock repurchases); see also Frantz Mfg. Co. v. EAC Indus., 501 A.2d 401 (Del. Ch.
1985) (applying a similar analysis).
146 See, e.g., Jones v. Ahmanson, I Cal. 3d 93, 109-10, 460 P.2d 464, 472-73, 81
Cal. Rptr. 592, 600-01 (1969) (holding that controlling shareholders have a fiduciary
duty when dealing in their shares). It should be noted that this remedy actually
would have resulted in an improvement in Mrs. Rodd's position as against the
fiduciary group, whereas a purchase of Harry's shares solely by the fiduciary group
would have left the relative positions of Mrs. Rodd and the fiduciary group
unchanged.
147 Compare Wilkes, 370 Mass. at 851-52, 353 N.E.2d at 663 with Forinash v.
Daugherty, 697 S.W.2d 294, 304 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (in discussing their fiduciary
duties, focusing on the roles of members of the control group as officers and
directors of the corporation).
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nated. As directors and controlling shareholders, however,
defendants also owe a direct fiduciary duty to Wilkes.' 4 8 It might be
inconsistent with that duty to terminate Wilkes's employment, and
thus his salary, particularly without any prospect of dividends in
49

sight.1

The situation is further complicated if we assume that, in addition to the four controlling shareholders, additional non-director
minority shareholders exist. In that case, not only will the controlling shareholders have a duty to treat Wilkes fairly, but as directors
they will have a clearer independent duty to the remaining shareholders to terminate Wilkes's employment. Fulfilling their duty to
Wilkes might well result in breaching their duty to the remaining
50
shareholders.'
Applying the principles of Donahue to this case, each member of
the control group would have to agree to a pro rata diminution in
salary in order to create a fund to be used to maintain Wilkes's salary
at a level equal to theirs in accordance with their original understanding and long term business practices. This agreement would
enable the control group to fulfill its fiduciary duty to Wilkes without
imposing additional costs on the business.15 ' This appears to be a
148 See 68th St. Apts., Inc. v. Lauricella, 142 N.J. Super. 546, 557, 362 A.2d 78,
84 (1976) ("It would thus be vain to attempt to distinguish acts done as shareholders
from those done as directors, or to distinguish a principal's duty to serve the
corporation as director from his right to protect his personal interest as
stockholder."), aft'd, 150 NJ. Super. 47, 374 A.2d 1222 (1977). But see Harris v.
Mardan Business Sys., Inc., 421 N.W.2d 350, 353 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988)
(distinguishing between controlling person's capacity as an employer and as a
shareholder); Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales Inc., 73 N.Y.2d 183, 188-90, 535 N.E.2d
1311, 1313-14, 538 N.Y.S.2d 771, 773-75 (1989) (same); Solomon v. Atlantis Dev.,
Inc., 147 Vt. 349, 354-57, 516 A.2d 132, 135-37 (1986) (applying Massachusetts law,
distinguishing between defendant's vote as a director and as a stockholder, and
holding that, since he voted in the latter capacity and since he satisfied the Wilkes test,
there was no breach of fiduciary duty).
149 See, e.g., Zidell v. Zidell, Inc., 277 Or. 423, 430, 560 P.2d 1091, 1094 (1977)
("We do not believe . . . that the protective approach taken in [Donahue] would
require the corporation to tailor its policies to favor a minority shareholder at the
expense of the majority." (citing Wilkes, 370 Mass. at 851-52, 353 N.E.2d at 663)). It
should be noted that Zidell was a derivative action and thus the question was
detriment to the corporation rather than to the minority shareholder.
150 Cf Comolli v. Comolli, 241 Ga. 471, 475, 246 S.E.2d 278, 281 (1978)
("Directors may decide in good faith what is best for the corporation, but this interest
must be consistent with good faith to the minority stockholder."). In this case, after
the complained-of corporate action was taken, the only two shareholders of the
corporation were plaintiff and defendant, so in fact, the director's notion of the
corporation's best interest was arguably identical to his own best interest. See id. at
471-72, 246 S.E.2d at 279.
151 Easterbrook and Fischel agree that this is the logical implication of Donahue.
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ridiculous resolution, at least when the members of the control
group provide necessary services to the corporation. But it is the
consequence of imposing a strict fiduciary duty upon individuals who
necessarily have conflicts cf interest which may very well clash at
52
some point during the course of their relationship.'
These analytical difficulties call into question the utility of fiduciary duty in the close corporation context.'- 3 The analysis is particularly troublesome in the context of transactions involving areas of
conduct not directly relating to the directors as shareholders. Donahue, involving a stock repurchase from a controlling shareholder with
corporate funds, was more clearly a self-dealing case than Wilkes,
which involved (at least superficially) hiring and termination decisions traditionally within the province of the board. Smith v. Atlantic
Properties,Inc.,154 the third case in the trilogy, also involved an area
exclusively within board discretion, the payment of dividends' 55 and
the making of capital improvements. Smith suggests that the difficulty lies not with the application of strict fiduciary principles in close
corporations but with the logical consequences of bending these
principles to ameliorate their harshness.
Smith, like Wilkes, involved a corporation in which four shareholders owned equal numbers of shares. At the time of incorporaSee Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 83, at 295; cf Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d
383, 388 (N.D. 1987) (termination of the minority shareholder's employment by the
majority shareholder constituted "oppressive" conduct within the meaning of North
Dakota's forced dissolution statute, "whether Sylvester discharged Balvik from
employment for cause" or as retaliation for instituting the lawsuit). In contrast,
another court explained:
Fiduciary duties cannot require the perpetration of highway robbery, nor
[A]
can they require the fiduciary to make a gift to the beneficiary ....
breach of a corporate fiduciary duty simply allows the minority to get the
most that it could have obtained in the absence of the breach. It does not
guarantee the minority a windfall.
Chiles v. Robertson, 94 Or. App. 604, 628, 767 P.2d 903, 916 (1989).
This might also be the result of applying Dean O'Neal's reasonable expectations
analysis and possibly even Professor Hillman's modification of that approach, each of
which is discussed in Part III. See infra notes 225-32 and accompanying text.
152 The absence of less harmful corporate means to achieve the goal of
terminating Wilkes does not mitigate the harm to him as a shareholder.
153 And, of course, the policy of treating close corporation shareholders as
fiduciaries.
154 12 Mass. App. Ct. 201, 422 N.E.2d 798 (1981).
155 See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919). But see
Fox v. 7L Bar Ranch Co., 198 Mont. 201, 212, 645 P.2d 929, 934 (1982) (" '[T]he
logic which supports judicial reluctance to interfere with dividend policies in large
corporations does not apply to close corporations.'" (quoting Manne, Our Two
Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259, 280 (1967))).
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tion, however, plaintiff (who was also a lawyer), included in the
charter and by-laws a provision requiring that all significant corporate actions be approved by 80 percent of the voting stock (the "80
percent provision"), effectively providing a veto power to each shareholder.' 5 6 For most of the corporation's existence, Dr. Wolfson, one
of the shareholders, disagreed with his colleagues over the payment
of dividends. 1 7 Dr. Wolfson (who not coincidentally was in a high
tax bracket) preferred that the business retain all earnings, for the
stated purpose of making capital improvements to the corporation's
property, and consequently vetoed the payment of any dividends.
The remaining shareholders, desiring dividends, refused to accede
to these capital improvement plans.'-" This stalemate resulted in
penalty tax assessments against the corporation by the Internal Revenue Service.' 5 9 Ultimately, the other shareholders sued Dr. Wolfson seeking a determination of dividends to be paid by the
corporation, the removal of Dr. Wolfson as a director and reimburse1 60
ment of the corporation from Wolfson for the penalty taxes.
Based on a footnote in Donahue, the Smith court found that
although Wolfson was in fact a minority shareholder, the 80 percent
provision effectively gave him (and every other shareholder) control
of the corporation. Consequently, the court imposed on Dr. Wolfson the controlling shareholder's fiduciary duty established in Donahue. '' Again, however, the fiduciary faced the problem of legitimate
conflicting interests, and the Smith court's articulation of the Wilkes
test amply reveals its recognition of this problem. In affirming the
trial court's imposition of liability on Wolfson for breach of his fiduciary duty, the appeals court applied the Wilkes test as follows:
The most pertinent guidance is probably found in the Wilkes case
.... essentially to the effect that in any judicial intervention in such
a situation there must be a weighing of the business interests advanced as

reasonsfor theiraction (a)
by the majority or controllinggroup and (b) by the
62
rivalpersons or group. 1
Although this formulation, is different from that used in Wilkes, the
court correctly expressed the underlying principle of that case in the
context of a corporation in which, in any given transaction, each of
156 See Smith, 12 Mass. App. Ct. at 202, 422 N.E.2d at 799.
157 Dr. Wolfson had requested inclusion of the 80%o provision. See id.
158 See id. at 203, 422 N.E.2d at 800.
159 See id.
160 See id. at 204, 422 N.E.2d at 800.
161 See id. at 206-07, 422 N.E.2d at 802.
162 See id. at 208, 422 N.E.2d at 802 (emphasis added and citations omitted).
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the shareholders could be deemed to be a controlling shareholdercontrolling shareholders have the right to "selfish ownership." That
right is balanced against the fiduciary duties they owe to other shareholders. The exercise of selfish ownership by the controlling group
is not a breach of fiduciary duty as long as the controlling group has
a "better" business purpose than does the non-control group. Given
the traditional corporate law principle that corporate decisions are to
be made by the majority (of directors or shareholders),1 6 3 the effect
of the Smith analysis is to eliminate the concept of fiduciary duty in
close corporations by permitting the majority's "better" business
purpose to override the interests of the minority. Although the analysis remains within the rhetorical framework of fiduciary duty, the
ultimate rule of Smith is that the court will uphold a corporate transaction made by directors who are controlling shareholders where all
of the directors are interested so long as a business purpose superior
to that desired by the minority can be demonstrated. In short, the
court simply threw up its hands when faced with a situation in which
conflict appeared irrepressible, and left the conflict to be resolved in
a simple power struggle."&
Although the Massachusetts SupremeJudicial Court started with
the high moral principles expressed in Meinhard, when it began to
modify those principles to resolve the practical problems arising in
their application to close corporations, the principles ceased to have
analytical utility in resolving legal disputes. The court's solution was
not to restore those principles but to shift the analytical focus from
the beneficiary's interest to the fiduciary's conduct, and to leave the
initial determination of the propriety of that conduct in the hands of
the fiduciary. The fiduciary is permitted to balance her own selfinterest against the interests of the beneficiary. To this balancing,
courts typically will defer.
C. The Tort of "Freeze-Out'"and the Action for Oppression:Fiduciary
Duty Transformed
States that have identified the existence of a fiduciary relationv. Comolli, 241 Ga. 471, 475, 246 S.E.2d 278, 281 (1978).
Although this is the clear result of the court's legal analysis, as a practical
matter, it didn't abandon fiduciary principles quite so starkly. Rather, it retained
jurisdiction over the case to ensure balanced conduct by both sides, see Smith, 12
Mass. App. Ct. at 210-11, 422 N.E.2d at 804, in a sense balancing their fiduciary
obligations. As I will discuss in the Conclusion, I believe that this mutual imposition
of fiduciary duties should be incorporated into legal doctrines as the most
appropriate solution to the problem. See infra note 243 and accompanying text.
163
164

See Comolli
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ship among close corporation shareholders1 65 have transformed the
standard of "utmost good faith and loyalty" announced in Donahue v.
Rodd Electrotype Co. 166 The resulting third stage of fiduciary development in close corporations is a doctrine unrecognizable as fiduciary
duty, although still couched in that rhetoric. For the most part,
courts have abandoned the assumptions and philosophy underlying
fiduciary duty when confronted with the logical implications of the
fiduciary's and beneficiary's common ownership of assets within the
close corporate structure. They have moved from the conclusion
that selfless conduct is both possible and a social good, to the easier
pragmatic solution of permitting self-interested conduct in the
absence of the fiduciary's malfeasance.
This change has also resulted in a shift in the function of fiduciary duty, from a broad moral precept designed to encourage corporate cohesion to a remedial tool providing relief to complaining
shareholders upon proof of the majority's bad conduct. Courts
claiming to apply fiduciary principles to close corporations find
breach of fiduciary duty only when controlling interests have abused
their position and intentionally excluded minority shareholders from
corporate benefits. The resulting doctrine, although applied under
the rubric of fiduciary duty, does not rest upon the philosophy
underlying fiduciary principles, but instead resembles intentional
tort. Rather than demand that the fiduciary protect the best interests
of the beneficiary, courts now require, in actions denominated the
common law tort of freeze-out 6 7 and the statutory remedy for
165 See, e.g., Orchard v. Covelli, 590 F. Supp. 1548, 1558 (W.D. Pa. 1984)
(finding breach of fiduciary duty where majority shareholder engaged in "systematic
effort" to deny minority shareholder benefits from the corporation); Comolli v.
Comolli, 241 Ga. 471, 474-75, 246 S.E.2d 278, 280-81 (1978) (majority shareholder
in close corporation who had corporation purchase shares of its own stock in order to
"depreciate[]" minority interest, "render him ineffective and 'freeze' his investment"
breaches duty of good faith); 68th St. Apts., Inc., v. Lauricella, 142 NJ.Super. 546,
563, 362 A.2d 78, 88 (1976) (finding breach of duty of good faith where coventurer
in closed corporation unjustifiably terminated the relationship in violation of the
agreement); In re Gene Barry One Hour Photo Process, Inc., 111 Misc. 2d 559, 565,
444 N.Y.S.2d 540, 544 (Sup. Ct. 1981) (citing Wilkes to same effect as Donahue with
respect to scope of fiduciary duty in interpreting New York dissolution statute).
166 367 Mass. 578, 593, 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (1975).
167 See, e.g., Sugarman v. Sugarman, 797 F.2d 3, 7-8 (1st Cir. 1986) (setting forth
test minority shareholders must meet to establish a freeze-out claim); Orchard v.
Covelli, 590 F. Supp. 1548, 1557 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (stating that attempts to "squeeze
out" minority shareholders constitute a breach of fiduciary duty); Masinter v.

WEBCO Co., 164 W. Va. 241, 251-56, 262 S.E.2d 433, 440-42 (1980) (upholding the
minority shareholder's claim of freeze-out); cf. Denihan v. Denihan, 119 A.D.2d 144,
147-50, 506 N.Y.S.2d 39, 41-43 (1986) (granting an injunction of corporate
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oppression,' 68 only that the fiduciary not actively seek to harm the
beneficiary.
Although cases following Donahue describe the scope of fiduciary
duty in terms of good faith and fairness, they actually analyze alleged
breaches in terms of bad faith and wrongful conduct rather than the
69
fiduciary's failure to pursue selflessly the beneficiary's interests.'
Many cases following Wilkes concede that legitimate business reasons
for the complained-of conduct would immunize the controlling
interests from liability, even though the conduct resulted in harm to
the beneficiary or disproportionate benefit to the fiduciary.1 70 The
transaction which minority shareholder claimed was designed to squeeze him out of
the corporation, pending arbitration pursuant to a stockholders' agreement).
168 Although the remedy for oppression has a statutory basis in most states, at
least two jurisdictions have a judicially created remedy for oppression. See Forinash
v. Daugherty, 697 S.W.2d 294, 305 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Masinter v. WEBCO Co.,
164 W. Va. 241, 252, 262 S.E.2d 433, 440 (1980).

The meaning of the term "oppression," while articulated in a variety of ways,
appears to be relatively consistent among jurisdictions, and seems to require proof
that the majority has abused its position or taken unfair advantage of the minority.
See, e.g., Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co., 20 Ill. 2d 208, 214, 220, 170 N.E.2d
131, 135, 138 (1960) (finding cumulative effects of improper conduct to be
oppressive); Kisner v. Coffey, 418 So. 2d 58, 61 (Miss. 1982) (holding that an abuse
of corporate position for private gain is oppressive conduct). Some jurisdictions
provide an approach less dependent upon abuse or wrongful activity than upon
analysis focused on the expectations of the beneficiary. See, e.g., Fox v. 7L Bar Ranch
Co., 198 Mont. 201, 209-10, 645 P.2d 929, 933-34 (1982) (defining oppression in
terms of reasonable expectations of minority shareholders); In re Kemp & Beatley,
Inc., 64 N.Y.2d 63, 73, 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1179, 484 N.Y.S.2d 799, 805 (1984)
(holding that the use of reasonable expectations "as a means of identifying and
measuring conduct alleged to be oppressive is appropriate"); see also Afterman, supra
note 97, at 1063 (noting that "oppression can be defined in terms of the reasonable
expectations of the minority shareholders"); Hillman, supra note 19, at 38-55 (noting
that oppression can "be defined in terms of reasonable expectations of the minority
shareholders in the particular circumstances").
Part III of this Article argues that this "expectations" approach is also a
departure from fiduciary principles. See infra notes 225-32 and accompanying text.
169 See, e.g., Galbreath v. Scott, 433 So. 2d 454, 457 (Ala. 1983) (noting that a
cause of action may exist where majority shareholders "deprive" the minority
shareholders of their share of corporate gains); Comolli v. Comolli, 241 Ga. 471,
475, 246 S.E.2d 278, 281 (1978) (noting that directors' actions taken to "freeze"
minority shareholder's investment demonstrates a "lack of good faith" and may be a
breach of fiduciary duty); Estate of Schroer v. Stamco Supply, Inc., 19 Ohio App. 3d
34, 39, 482 N.E.2d 975, 980 (1984) (referring to a majority shareholder's duty to not
"misuse power" by furthering personal interests at the expense of the corporation).
170 See, e.g., Cookies Food Prod., Inc. v. Lakes Warehouse Distrib., Inc., 430
N.W.2d 447, 453 (Iowa 1988) (finding that self dealing is permissible if corporate
directors can demonstrate "good f'aith, honesty and fairness"); Streb v. AbramsonCaro Clinic, 401 So. 2d 410, 414 (La. Ct. App.) (concluding that removal of a
minority shareholder from the board of directors does not necessarily constitute a
breach of fiduciary duty), cert. denied, 403 So. 2d 69 (La. 1981); Toner v. Baltimore
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clear import is that actions of controlling interests in close corporations will not result in liability so long as those actions are not
intended to harm the minority shareholders. This reduces fiduciary
analysis to nothing more than the avoidance of unfair treatment of
the minority, rather than exclusive pursuit of the minority's interests.
Perhaps the clearest articulation of this approach is Zidell v. Zidell,
Inc.:171

"If there are plausible business reasons supportive of the decision
of the board of directors, and such reasons can be given credence,
a Court will not interfere with a corporate board's right to make
that decision .... It is our duty to redress wrongs, not to settle competitive
business interests. Absent any bad faith, -fraud, breach of fiduciary
duty or abuse of discretion, no2wrong cognizable by or correctable
17
in the courts has occurred."

This, of course, is nothing more than a restatement of the business
judgment rule and leaves open the question of what constitutes a
breach of fiduciary duty or, in the language of the courts following
Donahue and Wilkes, what constitutes unfairness.
The answer, as suggested above, is that unfair conduct consists
of action taken to benefit the controlling interests at the expense of
the minority interests, with no independent legitimate business purpose. Alternatively, unfair conduct may exist where there is some
other showing of intentional wrongdoing. Thus in Leader v. Hycor,
Inc.,17 1 the Massachusetts court held that a recapitalization plan
designed to eliminate minority shareholders had a legitimate business purpose and did not violate the majority shareholder's fiduciary
duty. 174 On the other hand, courts have found unfairness where
Envelope Co., 304 Md. 256, 273, 498 A.2d 642, 650, (1985) (observing that
determinations of breach of fiduciary duty must be made by considering all relevant
facts and focusing on the business setting and purpose of the act when the alleged
breach occurred); Harris v. Marden Business Sys., Inc., 421 N.W.2d 350, 353 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1988) (finding no breach of fiduciary duty when majority shareholder
terminates minority shareholder's employment for a legitimate business reason);
Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 167 N.J. Super. 141, 155-56, 400 A.2d 554,
561-62 (Law Div. 1979) (no breach of fiduciary duty when close corporation
terminated minority shareholder's employment because of unsatisfactory
performance), af'd, 173 NJ. Super. 559, 414 A.2d 994, cert. denied, 85 NJ. 112, 425
A.2d 273 (1980).
171 277 Or. 413, 560 P.2d 1086 (1977).
172 Id. at 419, 560 P.2d at 1089 (quoting Gay v. Gay's Super Markets, Inc., 343
A.2d 577, 580 (Me. 1975)) (emphasis deleted and added). In support of this
proposition the court cited Wilkes, among other cases. See id.
173 395 Mass. 215, 479 N.E.2d 173 (1985).
174 See id. at 222, 479 N.E.2d at 177; see also Horizon House-Microwave, Inc. v.
Bazzy, 21 Mass. App. Ct. 190, 198-200, 486 N.E.2d 70, 76-77 (1985) (holding that a
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directors and officers, through the sale of their shares, have created a
single controlling shareholder where none had previously existed,
even where legitimate business purposes were present. 17 5 Courts

have also held the payment of preferential dividends 7 6 and selective redemptions'
to be unfair.
The cases demonstrate that isolated action taken by controlling
interests which harms minority shareholders, or which disproportionately benefits majority shareholders, is not by itself a breach of
fiduciary duty. In addition, courts require that there be evidence of
intentional wrongful conduct towards the minority shareholders,
designed to deprive the minority of corporate benefits. Lack of legitimate business purpose for an action or a consistent pattern of selfdealing or minority harm is evidence of such conduct.1 78 This mode
of analysis, of course, is entirely inconsistent with the notion of fiduciary duty expressed in Meinhard and Donahue.
Few of the cases following Donahue base a finding of a breach of
fiduciary duty on a single business action, such as a corporate repurchase of stock or excessive salary payments. Rather, in each case, a
pattern of conduct has led the court to conclude that the intent of the
majority was either to eliminate the minority from the corporation or
triangular merger, cashing out a minority shareholder, over his objection, while
providing stock in the surviving entity to the majority shareholder, had the legitimate
business purpose of quelling corporate dissent); Solomon v. Atlantis Dev., Inc., 147
Vt. 349, 356, 516 A.2d 132, 136 (1986) (applying Massachusetts law and holding that
the sale of corporate assets to a corporation owned by a controlling shareholder was
not a breach of fiduciary duty where a legitimate business purpose existed). But see
Bodio v. Ellis, 401 Mass. 1, 8-11, 513 N.E.2d 684, 688-89 (1987) (holding that on the
facts of the case, the majority interests of a closely held corporation had a duty to
maintain the balance of corporate control).
175 See Forinash v. Daugherty, 697 S.W.2d 294, 302-07 (Mo. 1985).
176 See Tillis v. United Parts, Inc., 395 So. 2d 618, 619 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981);
Anderson v. Clemens Mobile Homes, Inc., 214 Neb. 283, 287-88, 333 N.W.2d 900,
903-04 (1983).
177 See Comolli v. Comolli, 241 Ga. 471, 474-76, 246 S.E.2d 278, 280-82 (1978);
Estate of Schroer v. Stamco Supply, Inc., 19 Ohio App. 3d 34, 482 N.E.2d 975
(1984).
178 Cf Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 264 Or. 614, 630, 507 P.2d
387, 394 (1973). The Oregon Supreme Court explained that a
single act in breach of such a fiduciary duty may not constitute such
Ioppressive' conduct as to authorize the dissolution of a corporation
unless extremely serious in nature and that even a continuing course of
'oppressive' conduct may not be sufficient for that purpose unless it
appears that, as a result, there has been a disproportionate loss to the
minority or that those in control of the corporation are so incorrigible that
they can no longer be trusted to manage it fairly in the interests of its
stockholders.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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to deny it all corporate benefit. Thus, in Donahue, the facts revealed
not only a selective repurchase, but the offer by the corporation to
repurchase Mrs. Donahue's shares at an inadequate price,' 79 and the
consolidation of shares in the hands of a control group, composed of
members of the same family with a presumed commonality of interests.18 0 In Wilkes, not only was Wilkes's employment terminated, but
the corporation had never paid dividends' s ' and Wilkes was stripped
of his place on the board of directors.' 8 2 The requirement of a pattern of actions has become a fixture in the cases1 8 3 and has
culminated in the development of the "tort of freeze-out."
The tort of freeze-out receives its most cogent expression in the
First Circuit case of Sugarman v. Sugarman.18 4 The case involved a
family corporation originally founded by four brothers and ultimately controlled by Leonard Sugarman, the son of one of the founders and the holder of a majority of the corporation's stock. The
plaintiffs, descendants of the other founding brothers, owned the
balance of the other shares.' 8 5 In 1981, the plaintiffs sued Leonard
both derivatively and individually. In the individual count, they
86
pleaded "the theory of 'freeze-out' of minority shareholders,"'1
alleging that Leonard had deprived them of desired employment
with the corporation, paid himself excessive compensation which
"drained-off"
the company's earnings, and refused to pay
87
dividends.'
The court, affirming the district court's judgment on the freezeout theory, analyzed Massachusetts precedent to determine the elements of the cause of action:
See Donahue, 367 Mass. at 584 n.10, 328 N.E.2d at 511 n.10.
180 See id at 601, 328 N.E.2d at 519.
181 See Wilkes, 370 Mass. at 850 n.13, 353 N.E.2d at 662 n.13.
182 See id. at 847, 353 N.E.2d at 661.
183 See, e.g., Orchard v. Covelli, 590 F. Supp. 1548 (W.D. Pa. 1984), aff'd, 802
F.2d 448 (3d Cir. 1986). In discussing the systematic "freeze-out" of a minority
shareholder by the majority, the Orchard court observed that similar patterns often
occur in close corporations:
Tolstoi once wrote that "happy families are all alike; every unhappy family
is unhappy in its own way." We sense that Tolstoi was less familiar with
the American modern law of closely-held corporations from which we
note an alarming similarity in the demise of such entities where the
survival of a business association is so perilously tied to the continuing
vitality of intimate personal relationships.
Id.at 1550.
184 797 F.2d 3 (1st Cir. 1986).
179

See id.at 6.
Id.
187 See id.
185

186
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In these cases, the [Supreme Judicial Court] has pioneered in
developing an effective cause of action for minority shareholders
who have been denied their fair share of benefits in close corporations. At the same time, it has carefully set out the contours of that
cause of action. First, it is not sufficient for a minority shareholder
to prove that the majority shareholder has taken excessive compensation or other payments from the corporation....
Second, it is not sufficient to allege that the majority shareholder has offered to buy the stock of a minority shareholder at an
inadequate price....
[In order to establish the cause of action,] the minority shareholdermust
first establish that the majority shareholderemployed various devices to ensure
that the minority shareholder is frozen out of any financial benefits from the
corporation through such mu,ans as the receipt of dividends or employment,
and that the offer to buy stock at a low price is the "capstone of the majority
plan" to freeze-out the minority. 188
Thus the key to the theory of freeze-out is the occurrence of a series
of actions designed to deny minority shareholders all financial benefits from the corporation: The activity is tortious, 8 9 the tort must be
intentional, and the deprivation must be purposeful. 0° This, of
course, is quite different from the traditional twin duties of a fiduciary to act in the beneficiary's best interests and to avoid self-dealing.
Masinter v. WEBCO Co. 191 illustrates the increasing tendency of
courts to view actions for breach of fiduciary duty in terms of bad
faith and wrongful conduct. Masinter also demonstrates the similarity between the theory -of freeze-out and the other common
approach, the action for oppression, as well as the equation of both
of these theories with fiduciary duty. In Masinter, two of three equal
shareholders were allied against the third as a result of a falling
out.'

92

They voted to remove plaintiff from the board of directors

and to terminate him as corporate secretary, thereby depriving him
of his salary.' 9 ' In addition, they caused the corporation to enter
into a new loan agreement (to which the plaintiff had objected)
restricting, among other things, the payment of dividends.
In reversing the lower court's grant of summary judgment
Id. at 7-8 (emphasis added and citations omitted).
See id. at 14; see also Mack v. American Nat'l Bank, 510 N.E.2d 725, 738-39
(Ind.App. 1987) (noting the trend to label breaches of fiduciary duty as torts and
surveying precedent to that effect).
190 See Sugarman, 797 F.2d at 8.
191 164 W. Va 241, 262 S.E.2d 433 (1980).
192 See id. at 245-46, 262 S.E.2d at 437.
188

189

193 See

id.
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against plaintiff, the court recognized an action for oppression
notwithstanding the lack of a statutory basis in West Virginia at the
time of the facts giving rise to the complaint.19 4 Furthermore, the
court identified the attempt to freeze-out a minority shareholder as
one type of oppressive conduct. 19 5 Ultimately, the court equated
oppressive conduct with breach of fiduciary duty in the context of
close corporations.' 9 6 In articulating the standard for oppressive
conduct/breach of fiduciary duty, 19 7 the court looked to the definition expressed by the Oregon Supreme Court in Baker v. Commercial
Body Builders, Inc.:198

"'burdensome, harsh and wrongful conduct; a lack of probity and
fair dealing in the affairs of a company to the prejudice of its members; or a visual [sic] departure from the standards of fair dealing,
and a violation of fair play on which every shareholder who
entrusts his money to a company is entitled to rely.' 199
More specifically, Masinter noted that the freeze-out of a minority
shareholder consists of "depriving him, without any legitimate business purpose, of any benefit from his ownership and investment in a
2 00
corporation."
This cause of action is dramatically different from the action for
breach of fiduciary duty enunciated in Meinhard and Donahue and
rests upon completely different principles. In those cases, wrongful194 See id. at 245-48, 262 S.E.2d at 437-38. By the time of the suit, the West
Virginia legislature had adopted such a cause of action. See id. at 252 n. 11, 262
S.E.2d at 440 n.ll.
195 See id. at 251-54, 262 S.E.2d at 440-41; see also Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson
Realty Co., 167 NJ. Super. 141, 154, 400 A.2d 554, 561 (1979) (declaring freezeouts an abuse of corporate power prohibited by a New Jersey statute forbidding
oppressive conduct in close corporations), aft'd, 173 N.J. Super. 559, 414 A.2d 994,
cert. denied, 85 NJ. 112, 425 A.2d 273 (1980).
196 See Masinter, 164 W. Va. at 251, 262 S.E.2d at 440. The court discussed cases
from other jurisdictions concerning oppressive conduct as a statutory remedy and
determined that the West Virginia standard for breach of fiduciary duty was
equivalent to the standard that other courts had developed for oppressive conduct.
See id; see also Afterman, supra note 97, at 1060-61 (suggesting that the prohibition of
oppression in an English corporation statute may be analogized to a breach of
fiduciary duty); Macdonald, supra note 19, at 171 ("Courts began to acknowledge that
if the controlling shareholders breached their fiduciary duty to the minority
shareholders, oppression resulted.").
'97 See Masinter, 164 W. Va. at 251-52, 262 S.E.2d at 440.
198 264 Or. 614, 507 P.2d 387 (1973).
199 Id at 628-29, 507 P.2d at 393 (quoting Comment, Oppression as a Statutory
Groundfor CorporateDissolution, 1965 DUKE LJ. 128, 134 (footnotes omitted)). The
word misquoted by the Oregon Supreme Court is "visible." See Comment, supra, at
134.
200 See Masinter, 164 W. Va. at 251-54, 262 S.E.2d at 440-41.
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ness and intent were irrelevant: all that mattered was unequal treatment and the disloyalty of the fiduciary in the sense of failing to
further the beneficiary's best interests. The current approach is to
disregard loyalty entirely and to eliminate unequal treatment as a per
se violation, in favor of an evaluation of the intent and wrongfulness
of the majority's conduct. The result is judicial recognition of selfinterested conduct as a legitimate form of business behavior. It is
not an analysis premised on fiduciary duty at all.
A recent decision by the New York Court of Appeals further
demonstrates the trend away from fiduciary analysis and the increasing primacy (if not exclusivity) of intent based actions. In Ingle v.
Glamore Motor Sales, 2 0 1 Ingle had become an employee of the defendant corporation when Glamore, the then sole shareholder, refused to
sell him an equity interest in the corporation. Glamore subsequently
sold a portion of his shares to Ingle, who became a director and secretary of the corporation. 20 2 As part of the agreement with Glamore,
Ingle gave Glamore the right to purchase his stock if the corporation
ceased to employ him for any reason. Although the initial agreement
was later terminated, this provision remained in all subsequent
agreements to which Ingle was a party.2 °3
Almost twenty years after Ingle's initial employment, the Board
of Directors fired him and terminated his corporate positions. At the
time of his termination, Ingle owned twenty-five percent of the corporation's shares (at one point he had owned forty percent).20 4
Glamore informed Ingle that he was exercising his repurchase
option. Ingle sued, alleging that although he was an employee atwill, Glamore's fiduciary duty as majority shareholder precluded
Glamore from terminating Ingle and triggering the repurchase
option.

20 5

The court rejected this argument out of hand, affirming the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that Ingle's employment relationship was governed by New York's employment at-will doctrine,
20 6
not by any protection he might have as a minority shareholder.
The court went further:
Ingle's and the dissent's reliance on Fender v. Prescott .

.

. for an

535 N.E.2d 1311, 538 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1989).
See id. at 186, 535 N.E.2d at 1312, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 772.

201 73 N.Y.2d 183,
202
203

See id. at 186-87, 535 N.E.2d at 1312, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 772.
id. at 191, 535 N.E.2d at 1315, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 775

204 See

(Hancock, J.,

dissenting).
205 See id. at 187-88, 535 N.E.2d at 1312-13, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 773.
206

See id. at 188, 535 N.E.2d at 1313, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 773.
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exception based on the close corporate form in which this

employer and employee find themselves is unavailing. No duty of
loyalty and good faith akin to that between partners, precluding
termination except for cause, arises among those operating a business in the corporate form who 'have only the rights, 20duties
and
7
obligations of stockholders' and not those of partners.
In support, the court cited a 1957 case, Weisman v. Awnair Corp.,2 °s in
which the court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of a complaint by a
shareholder alleging breach of fiduciary duty on the ground that
what the plaintiff really was alleging was the conduct of a joint venture through the corporate form, which was impermissible. Unlike
joint venturers, held the court, corporate shareholders have no fiduciary duty towards one another. 20 9 Thus Ingle stands for the proposition that, under New York law, shareholders in a corporation, close
or otherwise, are not bound by fiduciary duties.2 10
Unfortunately the opinion's logic is difficult to discern, and
Judge Bellacosa's bifurcation of the relationship into employer/
employee and majority shareholder/minority shareholder is unduly
formalistic and unrealistic. But the truly interesting and significant
aspect of the opinion is that the plaintiff was not left completely without remedy. Rather, the court stated: "We have no occasion to
address issues involved in cases where the minority shareholders
may be discharged solely to avoid assertion of the legal rights
afforded to them under [the New York] Business Corporation Law
.

. .,

because no such matter has been pleaded and that is not this

case." 2 1 The rights referred to by the court are the statu tory right
of a minority shareholder to bring an action to dissolve the corporation because of oppressive conduct by the majority, and the majority's correlative right to buy-out the minority's interest. 21 2 Ingle
207 Id. at 189, 535 N.E.2d at 1314, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 774 (citations omitted)
(quoting Weisman v. Awnair Corp., 3 N.Y.2d 444, 449-50, 144 N.E.2d 415,418, 165
N.Y.S.2d 745, 750 (1957)).
208 3 N.Y.2d 444, 144 N.E.2d 415, 165 N.Y.S.2d 745 (1957).
209 See id. at 450, 144 N.E.2d at 418, 165 N.Y.S.2d at 750.
210 Although the court expressly reserved the issue of shareholders' fiduciary
duties in Ingle, in Gallagher v. Lambert, 74 N.Y.2d 562, 549 N.E.2d 136, 549
N.Y.S.2d 945 (1989), the court confirmed explicitly that no fiduciary duty among
shareholders precluded a majority shareholder from terminating the employment of
a minority shareholder to take advantage'of a low repurchase price triggered by the
firing under a shareholder's agreement.

Ingle, 73 N.Y.2d at 189, 535 N.E.2d at 1314, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 774.
See N.Y. Bus. CORp. LAw §§ 1104-a, 1118 (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1990);
see also In re Pace Photographers, 71 N.Y.2d 737, 744-45, 525 N.E.2d 713, 716, 530
N.Y.S.2d 67, 70 (1988) (discussing the origins and operation of §§ 1104-a and 1118).
In In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 64 N.Y.2d 63, 473 N.E.2d 1173, 484 N.Y.S.2d 799
211
212
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suggests that the statutory remedy, at least when it applies, is exclusive in New York, and that outside of that context no remedy for
fiduciary breaches by controlling shareholders exists.2 1 3 Ingle thus
illustrates the overt replacement of fiduciary principles with the theory underlying the oppression action.
III.

FIDUCIARY DUTY AND FIDUCIARY RIGIrrs

A number of commentators have suggested ways of analyzing
fiduciary duty in close corporations to account for the problems I
have described. In general, these proposals, while occasionally evident in the case law,21 4 are more sophisticated than the tests devel(1984), the court defined "oppression" in terms of the denial of the complaining
shareholder's reasonable expectations. See id.at 73, 473 N.E.2d at 1179, 484
N.Y.S.2d at 805. In Part III of this Article, I explain why the reasonable expectations
test is a departure from fiduciary duty. See infra text accompanying notes 225-32.
213 Ing/e has the limited virtue of being more straightforward than many of the
oppression cases in dealing with the relationship between fiduciary duty and
oppression. Other courts, however, have reached similar conclusions. See, e.g.,
Jordan v. Bowman Apple Products Co., Inc., 728 F. Supp. 409 (W.D. Va. 1990)
(holding that the statutory oppression remedy in Virginia superseded common law
rights of action for oppression and limited plaintiff's remedies to those available
under the statute). But see In re Denihan, 119 A.D.2d 144, 149-50, 506 N.Y.S.2d 39,
43 (1986) (enjoining corporate transaction that minority claimed was designed to
squeeze him out of the corporation pending arbitration pursuant to stockholders'
agreement).
214 See, e.g., Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 437 (7th Cir. 1987)
(applying hypothetical bargaining approach), cert. dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 1067 (1988);
Notzke v. Art Gallery, Inc., 84 Il.App. 3d 294, 298-99, 405 N.E.2d 839, 842-43
(1980) (finding defendants conduct "overbearing and heavy-handed" thus meeting
the statutory requirement of oppressive conduct as interpreted in the case law);
Capitol Toyota, Inc., v. Gervin, 381 So. 2d 1038, 1039-40 (Miss. 1980) (reversing
"involuntary dissolution on the statutory ground of 'oppression' where the
complaining party's reasonable expectations [had] been thwarted, but not grossly
so"); Fox v. 7L Bar Ranch Co., 198 Mont. 201, 208-10, 645 P.2d 929, 933-34 (1982)
(finding defendant's actions constituted a violation of plaintiff's "reasonable
expectations as a shareholder" and thus supported dissolution); Exadaktilos v.
Cinnaminson Realty Co., 167 NJ. Super. 141, 150-56, 400 A.2d 554, 559-62 (1979)
(stating that the "circumstances under which the parties' expectations . . . were
disappointed do not establish oppressive action"), aft'd, 173 NJ. Super. 559, 414
A.2d 994, cert. denied, 85 NJ. 112, 425 A.2d 273 (1980); McCauley v. Tom McCauley
& Son, Inc., 104 N.M. 523, 527-32, 724 P.2d 232, 236-41 (Ct. App. 1986) (reviewing
lower court's finding of oppressive conduct); In re Kemp & Beatley, 64 N.Y.2d 63, 73,
473 N.E.2d 1173, 1179, 484 N.Y.S.2d 799, 805 (1984) (holding that "utilizing a
complaining shareholder's 'reasonable expectations' as a means of identifying and
measuring conduct alleged to be oppressive is appropriate"); Topper v. Park
Sheraton, 107 Misc. 2d 25, 33-35, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359, 356-66 (Sup. Ct. 1980)
(applying implied contract analysis'); Meiselman v. Meiselman, 309 N.C. 279, 299,
307 S.E.2d 551, 563 (1983) (evaluating the parties' conduct in terms "not only of the
'expectations generated by the participants' original business bargain,' but also of the
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oped by courts.2 15 While these approaches may differ in their
particulars, the increasing equation or replacement of fiduciary analysis with analysis under statutory provisions or theories of intentional tort suggests that at the heart of the debate is the purpose to
be served by fiduciary analysis and its underlying social vision. The
debate really is about the way we, as a society, believe that people
can and should conduct themselves in business relationships and the
extent to which we are willing to use the law to encourage and, if
necessary, compel them to conform to that level of conduct.
Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel propose an approach
as removed from fiduciary theory as the conduct-oriented approach
toward which the courts have been moving:2 16 "Fiduciary duties
serve as implicit standard terms in contractual agreements that lower
the cost of contracting. Properly interpreted, fiduciary duties should
approximate the bargain the parties themselves would have reached
had they been able to negotiate at low CoSt." 21 7 Easterbrook and
Fischel readily admit the difficulty inherent in identifying the particulars of this hypothetical bargain.2 1' To solve the problem, they suggest that courts look to the solutions adopted by the shareholders in
close corporations that have reached an express bargain with respect
to the relevant issue, and apply it as law in the absence of reasons to
the contrary.2 19
This approach has been criticized soundly by Professors
DeMott 22 ° and Brudney. 22 1 The important point for purposes of
this Article is that the Easterbrook/Fischel proposal is not, despite
'history of the participants relationship as expectations alter.'" (quoting O'Neal,
Close Corporations: Existing Legislation and Recommended Reform, 33 Bus. LAw. 873, 888

(1978))).
215 See, e.g., Hillman, supra note 19, at 50 (noting that the "reasonable
expectations approach to date has received more scholarly then [sic] judicial
attention"); Macdonald, supra note 19, at 175 (noting that "only a limited number of
courts have used the reasonable expectations approach"). But see cases cited supra
notes 168 & 214.
216 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 83, at 291.

217 Id

218 See id. ("[I]t is often difficult for a court to determine how the parties would
have contracted had they anticipated this contingency.").
219 See id. at 300 (arguing that courts should observe how the larger close
corporations deal with issues such as handling deadlocks or repurchasing shares
from retiring employees). Judge Easterbrook has implemented this hypothetical
bargain approach in Jordan, 815 F.2d at 436. For a cogent and, I believe, compelling
criticism of this opinion, see DeMott, supra note 1, at 882-92.
220 See DeMott, supra note 1.
221 See Brudney, Corporate Governance, supra note 1; see also Branson, supra note 11

(criticizing the "contractarian approach" generally in corporate law).
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their assertions to the contrary, in any sense fiduciary duty. It does
not depend upon the existence of a fiduciary relationship, 2 22 it does
not consider the best interests of the beneficiary, and it does not
require any sort of disinterested conduct by the fiduciary. It is not
prophylactic but remedial in nature. Finally, it ignores the fact that,
as Professor DeMott points out, fiduciary duties are often counterintentional 2 23 and, as I noted, do not depend upon logical consis2 24
tency for their efficacy.
The underlying philosophy of the Easterbrook/Fischel proposal
is, of course, the desirability of enhanced efficiency. Based on their
(at least implicit) assumption that shareholders are rational utility
maximizers, and their concern with both excessive transaction costs
and burdening corporate flexibility, they elevate the value of efficient
economic arrangements over the value of selfless conduct and the
social vision it expresses. Whether or not they are correct in that
view, it is important in evaluating their proposal to understand that it
is a clear departure from fiduciary principles.
Dean O'Neal argues in favor of legislation directing courts to
protect the reasonable expectations of close corporation shareholders, apparently as a substitute for general fiduciary duty analysis.22 5
Although he suggests that this approach could be implemented
through interpretation

of oppression

statutes,2

26

he

advocates

broader legislation directing judicial relief to minority shareholders
based generally on the frustration of their reasonable expectations.2 2 7 The test Dean O'Neal envisions would take account of the
reasonable expectations that "exist at the inception of the enterprise,
and as they develop thereafter through a course of dealing concurred in by all of [the shareholders].
...
228 He would, however,
put "primary emphasis on expectations generated by the partici22 9
pants' original business bargain."
Professor Hillman has accepted and modified the idea of an
222 See DeMott, supra note 1, at 882 (suggesting significance of fiduciary
relationship to fiduciary analysis).
223 See id. at 887.

224 See supra note 128 and accompanying text; see alsoJ.G. SHEPHERD, supra note
1, at 3; B. CARDOZO, supra note 82, at 49-50.
225 See O'Neal, Close Corporations: Existing Legislation and Recommended Reform, 33
Bus. LAw. 873, 885 (1978).
226 See id. at 886.
227 See id.
228 Id.

229 Id. at 888; see also Afterman, supra note 97, at 1063 (noting the particular
relevance of the "original understanding of the parties" in an evaluation of
subsequent actions taken by the majority).
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action for relief based on disappointment of reasonable expectations
as a supplement to relief now provided by statute or equity "for such
matters as oppression, deadlock, mismanagement, and failure of corporate purposes."23 ° To alleviate his concern that granting relief
based solely on minority shareholders' reasonable expectations
would unfairly burden the expectations of the remaining shareholders and would create corporate instability, he has proposed a threepart test. The test requires the complaining shareholder to establish:
(1) that he or she became a participant because of a substantial
expectation or set of expectations known or assumed by the other
participants; (2) that the prospect that the expectation will be
achieved is unlikely; and (3) that the failure to achieve the expecta23 1
tion was in large part beyond the control of the participant.
The relief to be accorded upon such a showing is liquidation of the
complaining shareholder's investment in the manner "least disruptive to the continuation of the enterprise. "232
The O'Neal and Hillman approaches, like the Easterbrook/Fischel approach, attempt to resolve the fundamental problem of fiduciary analysis in close corporations by reconciling the legitimate
interests of the fiduciary with those of the beneficiary. The reasonable expectations approach is closer to fiduciary principles than the
hypothetical bargain approach because of its focus on minority interests, but is also a significant departure from fiduciary analysis in its
implicit attempt to develop objective zones of legitimate self-interest
for the controlling participants. Like the latter approach, it appears
more remedial in nature than prophylactic.
Although these proposals have real merit in resolving close corporation problems, they abandon the altruism inherent in fiduciary
analysis in return for more commercially-oriented concepts of good
faith and fair dealing. In light of judicial unwillingness to examine
the merits of business decisions, implementation of these proposals
would lead back to the current trend of examining the good or bad
faith of controlling shareholders.
Professor Hetherington's suggestion that minority shareholders
attempting to extract disproportional shares of the corporation's*
assets should be subject to the same duty of loyalty as controlling
shareholders addresses the conflict of interest problem in the con230

Hilman, supra note 19, at 77.

231

Id. at 77.
Id. at 81.

232
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text of fiduciary principles. 23 3 He perceptively identifies the duty of
loyalty as a surrogate for control, 2 4 and argues from this that its use
should be subjected to the same standards applied to the actual control possessed by the majority.

23 5

There are, however, two difficulties with his analysis. First, he
equates the duty of loyalty with standards of good faith and fairness
in commercial dealings, 23 6 an equivalence with which I disagree
since the latter concepts do not require the selfless disinterestedness
traditionally required of a fiduciary. The second problem is Hetherington's definition of breach of the duty of loyalty as conduct detrimental to the welfare of the enterprise, 237 which arguably is the
welfare of the majority. This definition of breach could again lead
back to the current problem of bias in favor of the majority.
Nevertheless, in a later article co-authored with Professor
Dooley which focuses on the general problem of illiquidity of close
corporation stock,2 3 Hetherington does return at least to the effect
of basic fiduciary principles (although expressly rejecting fiduciary
duty as a useful remedial tool) 23 9 by arguing in favor of a mandatory
buy-out right for non-controlling shareholders of close corporations
with dissolution as the ultimate remedy if the buy-out is not effected.
This proposal resembles fiduciary analysis in that questions of
motive and intent are eliminated, and the remedy imposed is absolute. However, fiduciary duty and selfless conduct for their own sake
are not part of Hetherington and Dooley's concern. Ultimately,
Hetherington rejects fiduciary analysis in favor of a contractually
based expectations analysis.2 4 0 This proposal is subject to the same
criticisms as the Easterbrook/Fischel, O'Neal, and Hillman proposals, and stems from Hetheririgton's search for a workable remedy for
majority abuse. 241' Again, this analysis disregards the prophylactic
function of fiduciary duty and abandons any attempt to encourage
high standards of business ethics.
233 See Hetherington, Duty of Loyalty, supra note 114.
234 See id. at 946.
235 See id.
236 See id. at 933.
237 See id. at 945.
238 See Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 10.

239 See id. at 6. One obvious error of this analysis is the treatment of fiduciary
principles as remedial, rather as prophylactic. Of course, this form of analysis is the
trend of the case law as well.
240 See Hetherington, Defining the Scope, supra note 9.
241 See id. at 21-22 (discussing failure of various remedies for dealing with the
majority's exclusion of the minority from sharing economic benefits the business has
generated).
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Finally, Professor Brudney advocates a return to strict fiduciary
principles, at least in certain transactional contexts.2 4 2 He evidently
does not regard the balancing of competing interests as an issue
because, at least with respect to these transactions, he sees no sufficiently strong motivation (other than self-interest) which would justify considering the interests of the majority. This approach leaves
no room for majority self-interest in accomplishing these transactions. He suggests, however, that the potential for abuse in close
corporations is so great that, absent imperative reasons justifying
these transactions, they should be flatly prohibited.
CONCLUSION

At the heart of fiduciary analysis is an assumption that individuals can act in a selfless manner and a desire that, for the good of
society, they do so. Although the early application of fiduciary principles to close corporation participants was consistent with these ideals, the practical problems of accommodating controlling
shareholders' legitimate self-interest has led courts and commentators to develop analytical approaches to fiduciary duty which depart
from them. My own view is that fiduciary duty is a valuable principle
and an important supplement to the remedial approaches provided
by statute.
The problems it presents in close corporation law are not insurmountable and can be resolved by imposing mutual fiduciary obligations on controlling and non-controlling shareholders. Fiduciary
duty is a substitute for control, although imperfect in that the former
requires judicial enforcement while the latter is self-executing. 243 As
a surrogate for control, it is not only a duty of the majority, but a
right of the minority, just as control itself is a right of the majority.
The fiduciary right departs, however, from corporate control in one
significant respect-it is unpredictable. Minority shareholders
always know who is in control of a close corporation, while the
enforcement of fiduciary duty is in the hands of an unknown judge.
The minority shareholder who is armed with this control surrogate
can, at least in theory, "abuse" the majority with litigation or threats
thereof. By burdening this fiduciary right with the same fiduciary
See Brudney, Fiduciary Ideology, supra note 1.
Hetherington and Dooley doubt the efficacy of legal principles requiring
significant time and money costs for their enforcement. See Hetherington & Dooley,
supra note 10, at 6, 34, 35, 39. Again, I suggest that this view is engendered by their
focus on the remedial rather than the prophylactic function of the law.
242
243
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duty with which the right of corporate control is burdened, we can
require both the majority and the minority to remain mindful of the
interests of the other in exercising their rights and restore fiduciary
duty to its prophylactic function.
In a sense, this proposal has been recognized implicitly by one
court. In In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc.,2 4 4 the New York Court of
Appeals, interpreting that state's oppression statute, noted that the
statutory remedy was meant only to protect the minority, not to provide a weapon to enable it to obtain unfair advantage against the
majority:
It would be contrary to this remedial purpose to permit its use by
minority shareholders as merely a coercive tool. Therefore, the
minority shareholder whose own acts, made in bad faith and undertaken with a view toward forcing an involuntary dissolution, give
rise to the complained-of2 4oppression
should be given no quarter in
5
the statutory protection.
Thus, the protection of the majority's legitimate exercise of its "right
of selfish ownership" is balanced with the need to protect the minority from wrongful deprivation by ensuring that the minority exercise
its right to protection with the same sort of fiduciary restraint
expected of the majority. Development of such a principle recognizes the need for shareholders to get along in a corporate relationship, as well as the social desirability of their doing so. It avoids the
risk, recognized by the Wilkes court, that the cure itself may produce
harm, and it encourages shareholders to recognize and respect each
other's rights in a way that fulfills the prophylactic purpose of fiduciary duties, and hopefully keeps such disputes out of court.
Although this mutual alitruism may seem too precious to some,
and too reminiscent of Alfonse and Gaston to others, requiring both
the controlling and minority participants to look out for the interests
of the other restores a vision of human behavior and social good that
is at the heart of fiduciary duty, while at the same time acknowledging the economic rights of each side. In so doing, it again elevates
the desirable level of corporate ethics above the morals of the marketplace reflected in the current intent-based tests developed by
courts. As a prophylactic measure, it is designed to avoid conflicts
rather than to remedy them.
Any evaluation of the various approaches to fiduciary duty in
close corporations must recognize their underlying philosophies as
64 N.Y.2d 63, 473 N.E.2d 1173, 484 N.Y.S.2d 799 (1984).
245 Id. at 74, 473 N.E.2d at 1180, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 806 (citations omitted).
244
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the principal guide to determining their desirability. Before we
depart from the high social vision implicit in traditional notions of
fiduciary duty in favor of easier and more expedient modes of analysis, we must ask whether the gain is worth the loss.

